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ARTICLE

An Empirical Assessment of

Pretextual Stops and Racial Profiling
Stephen Rushin & Griffin Edwards*
Abstract. This Article empirically illustrates that legal doctrines permitting police
officers to engage in pretextual traffic stops may contribute to an increase in racial
profiling. In 1996, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Whren v. United States that pretextual
traffic stops do not violate the Fourth Amendment. As long as police officers identify an
objective violation of a traffic law, they may lawfully stop a motorist-even if their actual
intention is to use the stop to investigate a hunch that by itself does not amount to
probable cause or reasonable suspicion.
Scholars and civil rights activists have sharply criticized Whren, arguing that it gives
police officers permission to engage in racial profiling. But social scientists have struggled
to empirically evaluate how Whren has influenced police behavior.
A series of court decisions in the State of Washington presents an opportunity to test the
effects of pretextual-stop doctrines on police behavior. In the years since the Whren
decision, Washington has experimented with multiple rules that provide differing levels
of protection against pretextual stops. In 1999, the Washington Supreme Court held in
State v. Ladson that the state constitution barred police from conducting pretextual traffic
stops. However, in 2012, the court eased this restriction on pretextual stops in State v.

Arreola.
Exploiting a dataset of 8,257,527 traffic stops conducted by the Washington State Patrol
from 2008 through 2015, we carry out difference-in-differences and triple-difference
analyses to assess whether the Arreola decision increased traffic stops among drivers of
color relative to white drivers. We find that the Arreola decision is associated with a
statistically significant increase in traffic stops of drivers of color relative to white drivers.
Further, we find this increase in traffic stops of drivers of color is concentrated during
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daytime hours, when officers can more easily ascertain a driver's race through visual
observation.
These insights suggest that judicial decisions like Whren and Arreola increase the
probability of racial profiling by police officers. We conclude by discussing the
implications of these findings for the literature on police accountability.
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Introduction
In 1996, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Whren v. United States that
pretextual traffic stops do not violate the Fourth Amendment.1 As long as a
police officer identifies an objective violation of a traffic law, the officer may
lawfully stop a motorist-even if the officer's actual intention is to use the stop
to investigate a hunch that, by itself, would not amount to reasonable suspicion
or probable cause. 2 In a unanimous decision, the Court concluded that an
officer's "[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause
Fourth Amendment analysis." 3
The scholarly response to Whren has been "overwhelmingly critical."4
Modern traffic codes "regulate the details of driving in ways both big and
1. 517 U.S. 806, 809, 819 (1996) ("Here the District Court found that the officers had
probable cause to believe that petitioners had violated the traffic code. That rendered
the stop reasonable under the Fourth Amendment....").
2. See id. at 812-13.
3. Id. at 813.
4. Gabriel J. Chin & Charles J. Vernon, Reasonable but Unconstitutional:Racial Profiling and
the Radical Objectivity of Whren v. United States, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 882, 884 & n.2,
886 (2015) (listing many existing studies supporting the proposition that Whren is
"notorious for its effective legitimation of racial profiling in the United States"); see also
David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth
Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 274, 278-79 (summarizing Whren and providing
contemporary context on the importance of the decision, and also noting that the
Whren decision illustrated a "systematic disregard for the distinctive concerns of racial
minorities"); David A. Harris, "Driving While Black" and All Other Traffic Offenses The
Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 545-46
(1997) (recognizing that while the Whren decision "makes some sense, at least from the
point of view of judicial administration," it ultimately could prove "profoundly
dangerous" to the development of a "free society, especially one dedicated to the equal
treatment of all citizens," because it will allow for police to "use the traffic code to stop
a hugely disproportionate number of African-Americans and Hispanics"); Tracey
Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333, 344-54 (1998) [hereinafter
Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment] (presenting evidence about the possible link
between pretextual stops and racial bias); Andrew D. Leipold, Objective Tests and
Subjective Bias: Some Problems of DiscriminatoryIntent in the CriminalLaw, 73 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 559, 565-72 (1998) (hypothesizing about how Whren may cause racial profiling,
providing examples, and theorizing about how existing law may make it difficult for
victims of racial profiling to succeed in any challenge); Anthony C. Thompson,
Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 981,
983-98 (1999) (tracing the way that the Court has attempted to remove race from its
consideration of Fourth Amendment issues and arguing that social-science data
suggests racially neutral searches may still involve police relying on racial judgments);
Tracey Maclin, Cops and Cars: How the Automobile Drove Fourth Amendment Law, 99 B.U.
L. REV. 2317, 2347-49 (2019) [hereinafter Maclin, Cops and Cars] (providing a useful
review of Sarah A. Seo's book on the Fourth Amendment and the American
automobile, Policing the Open Road: How Cars Transformed American Freedom, and
discussing the impact of Whren on police behavior). See generally SARAH A. SEO,
POLICING THE OPEN ROAD: HOW CARS TRANSFORMED AMERICAN FREEDOM (2019)

footnote continued on next page
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small, obvious and arcane." 5 If an officer follows any motorist long enough, the
motorist will eventually "violat[e] some traffic law," making "any citizen fair
game for a stop, almost any time, anywhere, virtually at the whim of police." 6
Scholars have suggested that when given this unfettered discretion, police
officers will use it in a way that disproportionately targets motorists of color.7
And given the high bar that litigants must clear in order to prevail on a
selective-enforcement claim under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment or its Fifth Amendment analog, the Whren decision
left individuals of color with few means to challenge the discriminatory use of
pretextual stops. 8 Thus, scholars and activists have long worried that by
allowing officers to engage in pretextual stops, Whren contributed to

(providing a comprehensive review of how the ubiquity of automobiles in the United
States has transformed policing tactics and the law, and also emphasizing the
importance of Whren).
5. Harris, supranote 4, at 545.
6. Id.; see also David A. Moran, The New Fourth Amendment Vehicle Doctrine: Stop and Search
Any Car at Any Time, 47 VILL. L. REV. 815, 831 (2002) ("[T]ake any minor traffic or
equipment violation, add a pretextual stop and a custodial arrest for the minor traffic
violation, and voila, you get a lawful search of the automobile.").
7. See Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, supra note 4, at 344-46. Additionally, as one
judge has argued, inherent to the use of pretextual stops is the risk that "some police
officers will use the pretext of traffic violations or other minor infractions to harass ...
[groups based on factors such as their] race or ethnic origin, or simply appearances that
some police officers do not like." United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 785-86 (2d Cir.
1994) (Newman, C.J., concurring).
8. See Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIA. L. REV. 425, 427 (1997) ("The
Whren Court left African-Americans and Latinos without an effective remedy for
discriminatory pretextual traffic stops when it suggested the Equal Protection Clause
as the appropriate constitutional basis for challenging these stops."); Pamela S. Karlan,
Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2001, 2010 (1998)
("As far as I can tell, with the exception of two New Jersey state court cases that
antedate Whren, there are no reported cases in which suppression was the remedy for
racially selective enforcement. And prior to Whren, the doctrinal handle for the
suppression was the Fourth Amendment: the seizures were unreasonable because they
were unconstitutional .... " (footnote omitted)); see also Wesley MacNeil Oliver, With
an Evil Eye and an Unequal Hand: Pretextual Stops and Doctrinal Remedies to Racial
Profiling, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1409, 1477-79 (2000) (discussing a related issue-remedies to
racial profiling-and arguing that the failure to correct patterns of racial bias in the
face of a U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) consent decree should potentially lead to
evidentiary exclusion).
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widespread and unchecked racial profiling 9 by American police officers. 10
Despite concern about the link between racial profiling and pretextual
stops, no academic study to date has empirically evaluated the effect of Whren
(or similar state cases) on law-enforcement behavior.1 1 This gap in the
literature stems not from a shortage of scholarly interest, but from the limited
data available on police behavior and a lack of within-jurisdiction variation in
pretextual-stop policies. 12 While many studies have found evidence of police
officers engaging in racially biased behavior, 13 no existing research has been
able to empirically link pretextual-stop doctrines like Whren to subsequent
patterns of racial profiling. 14
9. We adopt the definition of racial profiling used in Samuel R. Gross & Debra
Livingston, Essay, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 1413, 1415 (2002)
(defining racial profiling as occurring whenever an officer stops, questions, arrests,
searches, or takes some other investigative action because the officer is operating under
the belief that a person's racial or ethnic group makes them more likely than the
community at large to commit the kind of offense under investigation).
10. See infra Parts I.B, II (describing scholarly criticism of Whren and the existing literature
on this topic). In fact, the DOJ was so concerned about the link between pretextual
stops and racial profiling that it explicitly barred the Ferguson Police Department
from engaging in pretextual stops as part of a broader federal consent decree. Consent
Decree ¶ 80, United States v. City of Ferguson, No. 16-cv-000180 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 19,
2016), ECF No. 41 (stating that "officers will not conduct pretextual stops except where
the actual reason for the stop is to investigate a felony").
11. Searches of Google Scholar, Westlaw, and Lexis produced no study that attempted to
tackle this empirical question. But these searches produced dozens of empirical studies
about the presence of racial profiling in individual agencies or states, often with
hypotheses that this profiling was in part the result of laws permitting pretextual
stops. For more information on the existing literature, see Part II below.
12. As explained at greater length in Part III below, an ideal empirical assessment of the
link between pretextual stops and racial profiling would require some court or
legislature to issue a new rule related to pretextual stops that-to use the language of
economics-served as an "exogenous shock" by unexpectedly overturning an existing
rule or regulation on the topic. Provided that a jurisdiction kept sufficient data
(including the race of those targeted for traffic enforcement) before and after this
exogenous shock, researchers could use this data to evaluate whether the introduction
of this new legal rule resulted in any corresponding changes in police behaviors.
Unfortunately, the Whren decision did not present any obvious opportunities for such
a controlled experiment, as at the time of the Whren decision, very few police
departments kept data, including the race of those stopped by police for traffic
infractions. See infra note 155 and accompanying text.
13. See infra Part II (describing the existing literature, which finds racial profiling to be
common among American police departments but fails to link this profiling
specifically to court decisions like Whren).
14. Prior studies have acknowledged that data on this proposition has proven "hard to
come by." Leipold, supra note 4, at 565; see also David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by
Stereotypes and Serendipity: Racial Profiling and Stops and Searches Without Cause, 3 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 296, 304 (2001) ("The failure of most law enforcement agencies to collect
footnote continued on next page
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Employing a novel analysis of a newly available dataset, this Article is the
first to illustrate empirically that judicial doctrines permitting police officers
to engage in pretextual traffic stops contribute to a statistically significant
increase in racial profiling of minority drivers. 15 We focus our analysis on a
series of legal events in State of Washington that presents a rare opportunity
to analyze the effects of pretextual stops on police behavior. After the U.S.
Supreme Court decided Whren in 1996, the Washington Supreme Court
established differing levels of protection against pretextual stops in a series of
opinions. 16 In 1999, the Washington Supreme Court held in State v. Ladson that
the state constitution barred police from conducting pretextual traffic stops. 17
Then, in 2012, the court changed course in State v. Arreola, concluding that
officers could conduct "mixed-motive traffic stop[s]," effectively legalizing the
use of tactics akin to pretextual traffic stops.18 Thus, between 1999 and 2012,
Washington effectively barred the use of pretextual stops. 19 Since 2012,
and analyze data concerning car and pedestrian stops, or to conduct comprehensive
reviews of the legality of stops and searches ... has undermined efforts to make sound
empirical judgements.").
15. As best we can tell, the only other study to come close to making this type of claim is
CHARLES R. Epp, STEVEN MAYNARD-MOODY & DONALD HAIDER-MARKEL, PULLED OVER:
HOW POLICE STOPS DEFINE RACE AND CITIZENSHIP (2014). In that book, the authors

distinguish between two different styles of traffic enforcement-one focused
specifically on responding to traffic violations, and another focused on using traffic
stops as pretexts for other types of criminal investigations. Id. at 14-15. The authors
found that when police are involved in "investigatory stops," the most important
factor in who they stop is often the race and gender of the car's occupants (Black young
men were seemingly the most likely targets of investigatory stops). Id. at 66; see also
Kathryne M. Young & Joan Petersilia, Keeping Track: Surveillance, Control, and the
Expansion of the CarceralState, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1324-25 (2016) (reviewing EPP ET
AL., supra). Nevertheless, that impressive book was unable to isolate the effect of
changes in pretextual-stop doctrines on subsequent police behavior. Thus, to the best
of our estimation-and as described in more detail in Part II below-we believe we are
the first to conduct this kind of study.
16. See infra Parts I.C.1-.2 (describing how Washington moved from permitting pretextual
stops after Whren, to outlawing their use after State v. Ladson, to presumptively
allowing something akin to pretextual stops after State v. Arreola).
17. 979 P.2d 833, 842 (Wash. 1999) (en banc)
have held, and are entitled to hold, a
warrantless traffic stops or seizures on a
when the true reason for the seizure is not

("We conclude the citizens of Washington
constitutionally protected interest against
mere pretext to dispense with the warrant
exempt from the warrant requirement.").

18. 290 P.3d 983, 991 (Wash. 2012) (en banc) (defining a "mixed-motive stop" as one where
an officer has two separate, independent justifications for a traffic stop-one that gives
the officer the legal justification to conduct a traffic stop and one that does not-and
ultimately concluding that such mixed-motive stops do "not violate [Washington
Constitution] article I, section 7 so long as the police officer making the stop exercises
discretion appropriately").
19. As we discuss in more detail in Part IIIA below, the training given to law-enforcement
professionals in Washington suggests that, after Ladson, officers were cautioned
footnote continued on next page
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however, the police in Washington have operated under a narrowed definition
of pretextual stops that more closely mirrors the holding in Whren.20
We draw on a comprehensive dataset of 8,257,527 traffic stops conducted
by the Washington State Patrol between 2008 and 2015 to examine the effect of
Arreola on police behavior. 2 1 The Washington State Patrol employs around
1,100 state troopers, who are primarily responsible for enforcing traffic laws
on highways throughout the state. 22 By employing a difference-in-differences
framework, we find that Arreola is associated with a statistically significant
increase in traffic stops and searches of nonwhite drivers relative to white
drivers.2 3 To further bolster our analysis, we use a triple-difference framework
to observe the effect of daylight on officer behavior before and after Arreola.24
We find that most of the increase in traffic stops of nonwhite drivers after
Arreola occurred during the daytime, when police officers could more easily
ascertain a driver's race.2 5 This increase in traffic stops of nonwhite drivers
during the daytime hours is also statistically significant.2 6 These results
support the hypothesis that judicial approval of pretextual stops contributes to
racial profiling.

against pretextual stops (and similar behavior that courts may interpret as pretextual
stops). But after Arreola, the training materials first introduced the concept of a "mixedmotive" stop, which was not present in any of the previous training updates. See infra

Part III.A.
20. As we discuss in more detail in Part I.C.2 below, the majority in Arreola believed that it
had created a new type of stop distinguishable from pretextual stops permitted by
Whren but barred by Ladson. We take the view that even if the conduct permitted by
Arreola is technically narrower than that permitted by Whren, it still represents a
substantial increase in discretionary authority given to Washington police officers.
We also endorse the concerns expressed by the dissent in Arreola, which did "not
believe the spirit of Ladson [would] survive the court's opinion" because police were
now free to "stop citizens primarily to conduct an unconstitutional speculative
investigation as long as they [could] claim there was an independent secondary reason
for the seizure." 290 P.3d at 993 (Chambers, J., dissenting).
21. See infra Parts III.A-.B (describing the dataset and methodology).
22. About Us, WASH. ST. PATROL, https://perma.cc/V2CH-MZ6Q (archived Jan. 4, 2021)
(describing the number of commissioned and budgeted employees working for the
Washington State Patrol and stating that there are around 1,100 commissioned
employees and 1,100 civilian employees who handle approximately 3,092 contacts per
day and around 1,128,642 contacts per year across the state's thirty-nine counties).
23. See infra Part III.D (providing the regression outputs for these results).
24. See infra Part III.E (providing the regression outputs for these results focusing
specifically on the relationship between daylight and police behavior). For an example
of another study that utilizes such a triple-difference framework, see Jonathan Gruber,
The Incidence of Mandated Maternity Benefits, 84 AM. ECON. REv. 622, 627 (1994).
25. See infra Part III.E.
26. See infra Part III.E.
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Our analysis has important implications for the study of policing and
criminal procedure. Our findings are consistent with one of the most common
critiques of the Whren decision: that it leads to racial discrimination in policing.
If the Washington Supreme Court's decision in Arreola, with its somewhat
narrower holding than Whren, has contributed to a statistically significant
increase in the targeting of drivers of color, then Whren may have had the same
effect on policing all across the country. This increased targeting of drivers of
color via pretextual stops is a matter of serious concern, as even routine traffic
stops can escalate to more serious encounters involving the use of force,
searches, and other coercive police actions.2 7 More broadly, our findings
suggest that legal rules granting police officers increased discretionary
authority may create the risk of racially discriminatory law enforcement. This
insight provides ammunition for scholarly proposals to decouple criminal
investigations from traffic enforcement. It may also strengthen calls for the
integration of technology into traffic enforcement so as to limit police
discretion.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I summarizes the history of
judicial regulation of pretextual stops, with a particular focus on the scholarly
criticisms of Whren and the various sets of rules governing pretextual stops in
Washington. Part II evaluates the existing literature on the relationship
between pretextual stops and racial profiling. Part III sets out the methodology
and results of our difference-in-differences and triple-difference frameworks.
Part IV considers the implications of our findings.
I.

The Fourth Amendment and Pretextual Stops

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and
seizures by the government.2 8 Police conduct is typically considered a seizure
27. For example, some have alleged that Sandra Bland was a victim of a pretextual stop,
which ultimately resulted in her dying in police custody. In response, lawmakers in
Texas have proposed banning police from stopping drivers as a pretext to investigate
other potential crimes. See, e.g., Jolie McCullough & Cassandra Pollock, The Texas
Lawmakers Who Led the Sandra Bland Act Are Pushing to Reinstate the Police Reforms
Stripped from Their Original Bill, TEX. TRIB. (June 9, 2020, 12:00 PM),
https://perma.cc/7WWH-R29K; Amel Ahmed, Sandra Bland, Samuel DuBose and the
Rise of 'Vehicular Stop and Frisk," AL JAZEERA AM. (July 30, 2015, 2:00 PM ET),
https://perma.cc/WCJ8-JTX9 (describing Sandra Bland's stop as a potential pretextual
stop and using the death of Samuel DuBose as another example of where a pretextual
stop may ultimately lead).
28. U.S. CONST. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
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for Fourth Amendment purposes if, under a totality of the circumstances, a
police officer restrains a person's freedom of movement either through the use
of force or through some show of authority.29 Traffic stops entail a seizure of a
driver "even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting
detention is quite brief."30 A traffic stop is ordinarily considered reasonable for
Fourth Amendment purposes when a police officer witnesses a traffic
infraction and thus has probable cause to believe a traffic infraction has
occurred 31 or when a police officer has reasonable suspicion based on
articulable facts that a criminal act is ongoing. 32 In the years leading up to the
Whren decision, federal courts of appeals were split on whether pretextual
traffic stops complied with the Fourth Amendment. 33 This circuit split set the
stage for Whren.34
A.

Whren v. United States

On June 10, 1993, police officers were patrolling a "high drug area" in
Washington, D.C., when they observed two young Black men driving a vehicle
in a manner that the officers alleged aroused their suspicions.3 5 The vehicle sat
at a stop sign for "what seemed an unusually long time-more than 20
29. Margaret M. Lawton, The Road to Whren and Beyond: Does the "Would Have" Test
Work?, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 917,920 (2008); Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249,254 (2007)
("A person is seized by the police and thus entitled to challenge the government's action
under the Fourth Amendment when the officer, 'by means of physical force or show of
authority,' terminates or restraints his freedom of movement .... " (quoting Florida v.
Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991))).
30. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979).
31. Id. at 659; see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996) ("As a general matter,
the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause
to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.").
32. See Wayne R. LaFave, The "Routine Traffic Stop"from Start to Finish: Too Much "Routine,"
Not Enough Fourth Amendment, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1843, 1846, 1848 (2004) (noting that
most state authorities believe that reasonable suspicion is sufficient to justify a traffic
stop); see also 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH

AMENDMENT § 9.3(a) (5th ed. 2012) ("Most courts have assumed ... that traffic stops as a
class are permissible without probable cause if there exists reasonable suspicion, that is,
merely equivocal evidence. Such an assumption is to be found in the federal court
decisions of the various circuits, as well as in the decisions of most states." (footnote
omitted)).
33. Lawton, supra note 29, at 922-23 (explaining that most circuits had concluded that
pretextual traffic stops did not violate the Fourth Amendment; noting that the Ninth
and Eleventh Circuits adopted more stringent tests; and also noting that the Tenth
Circuit briefly adopted a reasonableness test before backtracking after finding that the
test was "unworkable" and led to "inconsistent" results (quoting United States v.
Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 786 (10th Cir. 1995))).
34. Id. at 923.
35. Whren, 517 U.S. at 808, 810.
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seconds." 36 The officers also observed one of the youthful occupants of the car
looking at the lap of another passenger. 37 When the police car made a U-turn
to further investigate, the vehicle allegedly made a sudden right turn without
signaling and drove away at an "unreasonable" speed. 38 The officers then
pursued the vehicle for a short time before executing a traffic stop.39 One
officer observed two large plastic bags of crack cocaine in the hands of a
passenger, Michael Whren.40 The officers arrested Whren and the car's driver,
James Brown. 41 In a search of the vehicle incident to the arrests, they
discovered additional drugs. 42
Whren and Brown subsequently faced multiple drug-related charges. 43
They tried to suppress the evidence against them by arguing that the officers
lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion to conduct the original traffic
stop.

44

The government maintained that the stop was objectively reasonable. 45
Regardless of their subjective intentions, the officers claimed they had an
objectively reasonable basis on which to conduct a traffic stop because the
driver of the vehicle engaged in "several traffic offenses." 46
In response, Whren and Brown argued that this objective justification for
the traffic stop was pretextual, and thus impermissible under the Fourth
Amendment.4 7 The actual reason that the officers pursued and stopped the

36. Id. at 808.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. It is worth noting that the circumstances leading up to the traffic stop made it a bit
unusual. The officers did not conduct an ordinary traffic stop, but instead followed the
car for a period of time before pulling up beside it at a red light. Id. One officer then
walked up to the side of the vehicle and asked for the driver to put the car in park. Id.
At that point, he observed the drugs and made the arrests. Id. at 809. This effectively
operated as a traffic stop for Fourth Amendment purposes, even if the circumstances
were atypical. Id.
40. Id. at 809.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Specifically, they "were charged in a four-count indictment with violating various
federal drug laws, including 21 U.S.C. §§ 844(a) and 860(a)." Id.
44. Id.
45. Brief for the United States at 7-8, 39-42, Whren, 517 U.S. 806 (No. 95-5841), 1996 WL
115816 (arguing for the use of an "objective assessment" of the actions of an officer and
maintaining that the stop in this case was lawful (quoting Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S.
463,470-71 (1985))).
46. Id. at 39.
47. Whren, 517 U.S. at 810. As the Court explained, the petitioners argued that "in the
unique context of civil traffic regulations" probable cause is not enough. Since, they
footnote continued on next page
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vehicle was to investigate an unsubstantiated hunch.48 The officers lacked
reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop the vehicle based on this hunch
alone.4 9 Thus, Whren and Brown argued, the officers impermissibly relied on a
pretextual justification. 50 The petitioners also emphasized that the scope of the
traffic code was so broad that, by following any driver long enough, a police
officer could "invariably" identify some "technical violation" that could
objectively justify a stop. 51 Further, the petitioners argued that allowing
officers to engage in pretextual stops would mean that officers "might decide
which motorists to stop based on decidedly impermissible factors, such as the
race of the car's occupants." 52
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that pretextual stops do
not violate the Fourth Amendment. 53 Because Whren and Brown conceded on
appeal that the officers had probable cause to believe that they had violated the
traffic code, the Court's analysis turned on whether the apparently pretextual
nature of the stop turned an otherwise constitutional seizure into a violation of
the Fourth Amendment. Walking through a series of major Fourth
Amendment cases, the Court rejected the petitioners' argument that the
"constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual

contend, the use of automobiles is so heavily and minutely regulated that total
compliance with traffic and safety rules is nearly impossible, a police officer will
almost invariably be able to catch any given motorist in a technical violation.

Id. (quoting Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 1, Whren, 517 U.S. 806 (No. 95-5841), 1996
WL 164375).
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. The petitioners believed that their opposition to pretextual stops was consistent with
Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990), where the Court held that police cannot use an
inventory-search program as a "ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover
incriminating evidence," as well as subsequent cases that analyzed whether inventory
searches were merely pretexts for other unconstitutional behavior. Whren, 517 U.S. at
811 (quoting Wells, 495 U.S. at 4).
51. Whren, 517 U.S. at 810. It is also worth noting that, as Tracey Maclin has observed, the
petitioners argued that police-department policy also barred
plainclothes officers from making routine traffic stops. Essentially, the defendants contended
that a traffic stop cannot be constitutionally reasonable when officers violate their own
departmental rules. The Court responded that this argument-to equate violation of
departmental rules with constitutional wrongs-would make the traffic code "a dead letter at
the option of the police department."

Maclin, Cops and Cars, supra note 4, at 2348 (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 8,
Whren, 517 U.S. 806 (No. 95-5841), 1996 WL 195296).
52. Whren, 517 U.S. at 810. Thus, the petitioners urged the Court to adopt a test that would
require future courts to ask whether the officer, "acting reasonably, would have made
the stop for the reason given." Id.
53. Id. at 807, 819.
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motivations of the individual officers involved."54 The Court also rejected the
argument that the expansiveness of modern traffic codes meant that an
objective test would give police officers unreasonably broad authority:
[W]e are aware of no principle that would allow us to decide at what point a code
of law becomes so expansive and so commonly violated that infraction itself can
no longer be the ordinary measure of the lawfulness of enforcement. And even if
we could identify such exorbitant codes, we do not know by what standard (or
what right) we would decide, as petitioners would have us do, which particular
55
provisions are sufficiently important to merit enforcement.

The Court did acknowledge that "selective enforcement of the law based
on considerations such as race" violates the Constitution.5 6 But the Court
concluded that victims of this type of selective enforcement must prove their
claims under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (or its
analog in the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause 57 ), not under the Fourth
Amendment.5 8 Thus, Whren stands for the proposition that police officers are
permitted to engage in pretextual traffic stops-that is, stops justified by
technical violations of the law but executed primarily so that the officer can
investigate an unsubstantiated hunch (a hunch that, by itself, would not create
constitutionally adequate suspicion).
B.

Scholarly Criticism of Whren

Legal scholars have leveled three primary charges against Whren. First,
some scholars have argued that Whren disproportionately harms drivers of
color. 59 For example, Bennett Capers has written that Whren "essentially
green-lighted the police practice of singling out minorities for pretextual
traffic stops in the hope of discovering contraband" because Whren allowed
54. Id. at 811-13.

55. Id. at 818-19.
56. Id. at 813.
57. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498-99 (1954).
58. Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.
59. See, e.g., Phyllis W. Beck & Patricia A. Daly, State Constitutional Analysis of Pretext Stops:
Racial Profiling and Public Policy Concerns, 72 TEMP. L. REv. 597, 597 (1999) ("The
primary concern with pretext stops is that they facilitate racial profiling, the process of
singling out drivers based on their race."); Abraham Abramovsky & Jonathan I.
Edelstein, Pretext Stops and Racial ProfilingAfter Whren v. United States: The New York
and New Jersey Responses Compared, 63 ALB. L. REv. 725, 726 (2000) ("In other words, the
Whren Court validated one of the most common methods by which racial profiles are
put into effect-the pretext stop."); Kami Chavis Simmons, Beginning to End Racial
Profiling: Definitive Solutions to an Elusive Problem, 18 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & Soc.JUST. 25,
29 (2011) (describing the holding of Whren and concluding that "highly discretionary
[investigatory] stops permit racial bias, either explicit or implicit, to go unchecked and
unpunished").
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police to "use race as an 'unofficial' proxy for suspicion." 60 David Harris has
argued that Whren leads police officers to "use the traffic code to stop a hugely
disproportionate number of African-Americans and Hispanics." 61 Devin
Carbado has bluntly concluded that after Whren, "at least under the Fourth
Amendment, racial-profiling claims are not constitutionally cognizable"
because "race matters in the Fourth Amendment context only to the extent
that a police officer's conduct is overtly racially coercive." 62 Kevin Johnson has
written a detailed account of how Whren, alongside other major Supreme
Court decisions, has "made legal challenges to profiling more, not less, difficult,
thereby implicitly encouraging police officers to rely on racial profiles in law
enforcement." 63 And according to Anthony Thompson and others,
psychological evidence suggests that race plays an integral role in police
officers' perceptions and subsequent behavior, which compounds the racialprofiling concerns associated with pretextual stops. 64
Second, scholars like Albert Alschuler, 65 Angela Davis, 66 and Pamela
Karlan 67 have described how, by forcing litigants to bring all challenges to
pretextual stops under the Equal Protection Clause rather than the Fourth
Amendment, Whren functionally leaves victims of racial profiling with few
remedies because of the "substantial hurdles" equal-protection claimants face. 68
Typically, an equal-protection claimant must prove that "a police officer
intentionally discriminated against him based on his race," 69 which is nearly

60. I. Bennett Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment: Race, Citizenship, and the Equality
Principle,46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 33-34 (2011).
61. Harris, supranote 4, at 546.
62. Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 1033, 1044
(2002).
63. Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America Became the Law of the Land: United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly Rebellious
Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1007 (2010).
64. See Thompson, supra note 4, at 983-91 (describing the social-science literature on how
race inevitably influences police perceptions of potential suspects).
65. See Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Profiling and the Constitution, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 163,
168, 193 (claiming that "[t]he Court appeared to treat the Fourth Amendment and the
Equal Protection Clause as hermetically sealed units whose principles must not
contaminate one another," and connecting this to the "difficulty of devising effective
injunctive remedies for unlawful profiling").
66. See Davis, supra note 8, at 435-38 (describing in detail the hurdles to recovery for
victims of racial profiling after Whren, when read in conjunction with other cases).
67. See Karlan, supra note 8, at 2003-05 (describing how Whren, when read alongside United
States v. Armstrong, makes it particularly difficult to obtain relief in the case of racial
profiling).
68. Davis, supra note 8, at 427.
69. Id. at 436.
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impossible to prove in the event of a pretextual stop-particularly given
widespread evidence of police perjury.7 0 In fact, Andrew Leipold 7 1 and Tracey
Maclin 72 have worried about the effects of the Whren decision in light of the
evidence of police officers' willingness to lie on the stand in order to build cases
against criminal defendants.
Third, scholars like Gabriel Chin and Charles Vernon have concluded that
the Whren case was wrongly decided as a constitutional matter. 73 Chin and
70. See, e.g., Morgan Cloud, Essay, The Dirty Little Secret, 43 EMORY L.J. 1311, 1315 (1994)
(stating that perjury by police officers "occurs most frequently when officers are
testifying about searches and seizures and witness interrogations," and noting that
"[p]olice perjury about these topics is often the product of rules imposing penalties for
illegal police practices"). See generally Andrew J. McClurg, Good Cop, Bad Cop: Using
Cognitive Dissonance Theory to Reduce Police Lying, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 389 (1999)
(discussing police lying); Carol A. Chase, Rampart: A Crying Need to Restore Police
Accountability, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 767 (2001) (advocating for reforms designed to
address police lying).
71. See Leipold, supra note 4, at 562 ("Put bluntly, if police perjury is as common as some
suspect, the likelihood of discovering an improper motive through the judicial process
is slim indeed." (footnote omitted)).
72. As Tracey Maclin has argued, "[o]ne need not accept that perjury is a pervasive
problem in every police department to recognize that perjury (or the potential for
perjury) may play a central role in how pretextual traffic stops are carried out." See
Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, supra note 4, at 379-86 (arguing that "[p]olice
often commit perjury" to "deny black and Hispanic motorists their substantive rights
under the Fourth Amendment," providing a detailed summary of the problem of police
perjury, and discussing how Whren may exacerbate this issue).
73. See Chin & Vernon, supra note 4, at 887; see also Diana Roberto Donahoe, Essay, "Could
Have," "Would Have:" What the Supreme Court Should Have Decided in Whren v. United
States, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1193, 1194-95 (1997) (criticizing the test adopted by the
Whren Court, which leads to "arbitrary, unconstitutional searches and seizures," and
ultimately offering an alternative proposal). Admittedly, this quick summary of the
scholarly backlash to Whren does not cover all articles and essays written on the topic.
Numerous other scholars have also done important work in this area. We regret that
we are unable to discuss all of these important works in the detail they deserve. For
additional scholarship, see, for example, Alberto B. Lopez, Racial Profiling and Whren:
Searchingfor Objective Evidence of the Fourth Amendment on the Nation's Roads, 90 KY. L.J.
75, 80 (2001-2002) (providing a historical account of the Whren decision and situating it
within the broader debate about racial profiling); Daniel B. Yeager, The Stubbornness of
Pretexts, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 611, 617-28 (2003) (providing an account of Whren and
situating the case within previous doctrine); LaFave, supra note 32, at 1859 ("The
totality of the Court's analysis in Whren is, to put it mildly, quite disappointing. By
misstating its own precedents and mischaracterizing the petitioners' central claim, the
Court managed to trivialize what in fact is an exceedingly important issue regarding a
pervasive law-enforcement practice."); and Jeffrey Fagan & Mukul Bakhshi, New
Frameworksfor Racial Equality in the Criminal Law, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 1, 8-9
(2007) (linking the differential treatment by police that African Americans and other
racial and ethnic minorities experience to selective police enforcement). For an
excellent and thorough summary of the scholarly critiques of Whren, see Lawton, supra
note 29, at 928-32. These critiques have been echoed in prominent campaigns by civil
rights organizations like the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), which alleged
footnote continued on next page
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Vernon have argued that the Court should regulate pretextual stops in a
manner similar to its previous regulation of abuses of prosecutorial
discretion. 74 Chin and Vernon also believe that the Court's desire for Fourth
Amendment objectivity leaves ample room for the regulation of the subjective
motivations of police officers in executing traffic stops. 75 Yet despite the
widespread concern about Whren, few states have enacted limitations on the
use of pretextual stops, as discussed in more depth in the next Subpart.
C.

State Departures from Whren

States have generally not strayed far from the core holding of Whren. State
constitutions sometimes include their own versions of the Fourth
Amendment, limiting the ability of state law enforcement to engage in
unreasonable searches or seizures. 76 Many of these state constitutional
provisions are broader than their federal counterpart, limiting the ability of
state law enforcement to engage in conduct that might otherwise be permitted
under the U.S. Constitution.77 And state legislatures are also free to pass
legislation limiting the ability of police officers in their states to engage in
pretextual stops. Nevertheless, very few state supreme courts or state
legislatures have established more stringent limitations on pretextual stops
than those articulated in Whren. A 2016 analysis by Margaret Lawton suggests
that at least two states-New Mexico and Washington-have established some
limitations on pretextual stops via judicial rulings.7 8
that Whren would lead police to target those "Driving While Black." Carbado, supra
note 62, at 1035-40 (describing and quoting from an ACLU pamphlet); see also David A.
Harris, Driving While Black: Racial Profiling on Our Nation's Highways, ACLU (June
1999), https://perma.cc/FRE4-HFBZ.
74. Chin & Vernon, supra note 4, at 902.
75. See id. at 904-12.
76. See infra Part I.C.1 (describing the application of the State of Washington's version of
the Fourth Amendment to regulate police behavior).
77. See, e.g., Jack L. Landau, Should State Courts Departfrom the Fourth Amendment? Search and
Seizure, State Constitutions, and the Oregon Experience, 77 MISS. L.J. 369, 394-95 (2007)
(explaining how Oregon began departing from the Fourth Amendment and "remain[s]
free ... to interpret [its] own constitutional provision regarding search and seizure and
to impose higher standards on searches and seizures under [its] own constitution than
are required by the federal constitution" (quoting State v. Caraher, 653 P.2d 942, 947
(Or. 1982) (en banc))).
78. Margaret M. Lawton, State Responses to the Whren Decision, 66 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV.
1039, 1040-41 (2016) (discussing these two state departures from Whren). Rhode Island
has passed a law that explicitly outlaws racial profiling, but does not directly address
the issue of pretextual stops. See Comprehensive Community-Police Relationship Act
of 2015, 31 R.I. GEN. LAws ch. 21.2 (2021). For more on New Mexico's rule, see Michael
Sievers, Note, State v. Ochoa: The End of Pretextual Stops in New Mexico?, 42 N.M. L. REV.
595, 595-96 (2012). For more on Washington's rule, see Parts I.C.1-.2 below.
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Among these two states, Washington is distinctive in its experimentation
with different rules regulating pretextual stops over time. The Washington
Supreme Court first acted to prohibit pretextual stops in State v. Ladson.79
Then, thirteen years later in State v. Arreola, the same court backtracked by
redefining the term "pretextual" to apply to a relatively narrow set of factual
circumstances.8 0 As a result, Washington is unique among American states in
its variation of the rules governing pretextual stops by law-enforcement
officers. The Subparts that follow walk through this recent history of judicial
regulation of pretextual stops in Washington.
1.

State v. Ladson: A ban on pretextual stops

The Washington Supreme Court first considered the constitutionality of
pretextual traffic stops in 1999 in State v. Ladson.81 That case originated in a
traffic stop conducted by Officer Jim Mack of the Lacey Police Department and
Detective Cliff Ziesmer of the Thurston County Sheriff's Department in
October 1995.82 While working on a gang patrol, Officers Mack and Ziesmer
became suspicious of a car driven by a Black man named Richard Fogle.8 3 The
officers recognized Fogle as the suspect from an "unsubstantiated street rumor"
involving drugs.8 4 This rumor did not give the officers the necessary
reasonable suspicion required to execute a traffic stop.8 5 Nevertheless, the
officers followed Fogle's vehicle until they noticed that his license-plate sticker
had recently expired.86 The officers did not deny that they used this expired
license-plate sticker as a pretext to justify stopping Fogle's vehicle so that they
could investigate the unsubstantiated rumor.8 7
After discovering that Fogle had a suspended license, the officers arrested
him and searched his car incident to arrest.8 8 They also ordered Fogle's
passenger, a Black man named Thomas Ladson, out of the car and patted him
79. See infra Part I.C.1.
80. See infra Part I.C.2.
81. 979 P.2d 833 (Wash. 1999) (en banc).
82. Id. at 836.
83. Id.
84. Id. (noting that the trial court found that "Officer Mack's suspicions about Fogle's
reputed drug dealing was his motivation in finding a legal reason to initiate the stop of
Fogle's vehicle" (quoting the lower-court record)).
85. See id. (describing how the officers "tailed the Fogle vehicle looking for a legal
justification to stop the car," going as far as "shadow[ing] the vehicle while it refueled at
a local filling station").
86. Id.
87. Id. ("The officers do not deny the stop was pretextual.").
88. Id.
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down.8 9 After finding a small handgun, the officers placed Ladson under arrest,
at which point the officers found $600 in cash and some small baggies of
marijuana while searching Ladson's person. 90 The state charged Ladson "with
unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver while
armed with a deadly weapon, and possession of a stolen firearm." 91 Ladson
moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the traffic stop, arguing that it
was the result of a pretextual stop in violation of article I, section 7 of the
Washington Constitution. 92 Article I, section 7 states that "[n]o person shall be
disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of
law." 93 While Whren established a permissive standard for pretextual stops, the
Washington Supreme Court observed that article I, section 7 of the
Washington Constitution had previously been found to be more protective
than the U.S. Constitution.94 Thus, the question raised by Ladson was whether
the more protective Washington Constitution prohibited pretextual traffic
stops, even if the U.S. Constitution did not.
In a 5-4 decision, the court held that the use of pretextual stops violated the
Washington Constitution. 95 As the majority explained:
[T]he problem with a pretextual traffic stop is that it is a search or seizure which
cannot be constitutionally justified for its true reason (i.e., speculative criminal
investigation), but only for some other reason (i.e., to enforce traffic code) which
96
is at once lawfully sufficient but not the real reason.

Permitting pretextual stops would effectively be prioritizing "form over
substance" and would represent a "triumph of expediency at the expense of
reason." 97 Thus, the court reasoned, stops based on a bare suspicion of
wrongdoing, like that of Mr. Ladson, were "inherently unreasonable" even if
an officer were able to identify some minor, pretextual justification. 98
The court closed by giving guidance to officers and trial courts for
deciding whether a traffic stop was pretextual and thus unconstitutional. It
89. Id.
90.

Id.

91. Id.
92. Id. at 836-37 (describing Ladson's argument that "the state constitution provides
broader protection than does the Fourth Amendment in the area of pretextual traffic
stops").
93. Id. at 837 (quoting WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 842-43 (concluding that evidence obtained via such a pretextual stop must also be
suppressed).
96. Id. at 838 (emphasis added).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 839 (citing cases where the court had previously expressed concern about
pretextual stops).
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instructed that courts ought to examine the "totality of the circumstances,"
including both the "subjective intent of the officer" and the "objective
reasonableness of the officer's behavior." 99 This remained the law from July 1,
1999, until the Washington Supreme Court sharply changed course thirteen
years later.
2.

State v. Arreola: The introduction of mixed-motive stops

In December 2012, in State v. Arreola, the Washington Supreme Court again
considered the constitutionality of pretextual traffic stops under article I,
section 7 of the state constitution.100 Arreola was presented not as a direct
challenge to the core holding of Ladson, but as a clarification of the definition
of the term "pretextual." 10 1 The case arose out of the traffic stop of Gilberto
Chacon Arreola by Officer Tony Valdivia in Mattawa, Washington, on
October 10, 2009.102 Officer Valdivia received a tip about a possible drunk
driver in a vehicle similar to Arreola's. 103 Officer Valdivia followed Arreola for
around thirty to forty-five seconds without observing any behaviors
consistent with intoxicated driving. 104 Then he noticed that the vehicle had an
altered exhaust system, which technically violated Washington traffic code. 105
Officer Valdivia then executed a traffic stop. 106 The trial court found that
Officer Valdivia's primary motivation for pulling over Arreola's vehicle was to
investigate the drunk-driving tip. 107 Nevertheless, Officer Valdivia insisted
that the altered exhaust system was another "actual reason for the stop." 108 And
99. Id. at 843.
100. 290 P.3d 983, 986 (Wash. 2012) (en banc).
101. Id. ("The issue in this case is whether a traffic stop motivated primarily by an
uncorroborated tip, but also independently motivated by a reasonable articulable
suspicion of a traffic infraction, is unconstitutionally pretextual under article I,
section 7 of the Washington State Constitution and State v. Ladson." (citation omitted)).
102. Id. at 986-87.
103. Id. at 986.
104. Id. at 986-87.

105. Id.
106. Id. at 987 ("Still without any signs of intoxicated driving, Officer Valdivia then
activated his overhead lights and pulled over the car.").
107. Id. (noting that Officer Valdivia continued to claim that the tip was not the only reason
for the stop and clarifying that "he would sometimes commence a traffic stop for an
altered muffler because, as a member of the community, he appreciates concerns about
the excessive noise that such mufflers emit").
108. Id. (noting that Officer Valdivia further justified his decision by explaining that while
he would not normally "go out of his way to chase down a car with an altered muffler,
he often would commence a traffic stop if already on the road and behind such a
vehicle, so long as conducting the stop would not hinder a more pressing
investigation").
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he claimed that while it was the uncorroborated tip that led him to follow
Arreola's vehicle, he "would have stopped the vehicle, once following it, even if
he wasn't suspicious of a DUI."lo9
Thus, the issue in Arreola was whether Officer Valdivia's actions
constituted an impermissible "pretextual" stop within the meaning of
Ladson.1 10 Ultimately, the court narrowed the core holding of Ladson
significantly, holding that Officer Valdivia's behavior constituted a lawful
"mixed-motive" stop rather than an impermissible "pretextual" stop.111 To
delineate between constitutionally permissible mixed-motive stops and
impermissible pretextual stops, the court contrasted the facts in Ladson and
Arreola. According to the majority, the officer in Ladson had admitted to the
court that he was relying on "a false reason" intended to disguise his "real
motive." 112 The officer in Ladson likely "would not have conducted the stop
had there been no street rumor," meaning that the officer "abused his discretion
by conducting the stop without deeming it reasonably necessary to enforce
license plate tab regulations."1 13 In contrast, the officer in Arreola testified that
the muffler violation was an "actual" and independent justification for the
traffic stop apart from the unsubstantiated tip.11 4 In the majority's view, this
made the stop in Arreola a permissible mixed-motive stop distinguishable from
the pretextual stop in Ladson.115
The dissent in Arreola argued that the majority opinion fundamentally
redefined and narrowed Ladson's prohibition on pretextual stops so as to make
it virtually unrecognizable. 116 The dissent worried that the Arreola majority
relied on a tenuous distinction between the term "real" and the term
"primary."l1 7 The majority opinion said that a police officer may lawfully
conduct a traffic stop where the "primary" motivation is a desire to investigate
a hunch, but officers are still barred from conducting pretextual stops where
the investigation of a hunch is the "real" reason for the stop. 118 How, then,
109. Id. (quoting the lower-court record).
110. Id. at 986.
111. Id. at 991 ("We hold that a traffic stop is not unconstitutionally pretextual so long as
investigation of either criminal activity or a traffic infraction (or multiple infractions),
for which the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion, is an actual, conscious, and
independent cause of the traffic stop.").
112. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Ladson, 979 P.2d 833, 843 n.l 1 (Wash. 1999) (en
banc)).
113.

Id.

114. Id. at 987.
115. Id. at 991.
116. Id. at 992-93 (Chambers, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 993.
118.

Id.
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should courts distinguish between "real" and "primary"motivations? In reality,
the dissent argued, this distinction is practically meaningless; the rule adopted
by the court effectively enabled the police in Washington to engage lawfully in
pretextual stops. 119
Reasonable readers may disagree on the real-world implications of the
Washington Supreme Court's decision in Arreola. Nevertheless, the decision
substantially narrowed the holding of Ladson by giving police permission to
engage in mixed-motive traffic stops that, at minimum, resemble pretextual
stops. Thus, Arreola represented an expansion of law-enforcement power to
execute discretionary traffic stops against motorists in Washington.
II. Existing Literature
An extensive and growing body of literature suggests that police treat
drivers of color differently than white drivers. 120 These studies commonly find
that police are more likely to subject drivers of color to stops, searches, and
other coercive actions compared to white drivers. 12 1 In many of these cases,
differences in driving behavior do not explain this differential treatment.122
All of this suggests that police in a wide number of jurisdictions may consider a
driver's race (either implicitly or explicitly) in making traffic-enforcement
decisions. Some studies point to Whren-and the broad discretion and deference
given to police generally-as contributing to this type of racial profiling. 123 But
no study to date has empirically tested the link between Whren (and its state
law equivalents) and racially biased behavior by police officers.
Shortly after the Whren decision, David Rudovsky wrote a detailed
summary of the then-existing universe of studies on racial profiling by police
in traffic stops. 124 At that point, studies of the New Jersey State Police, 125
119. Id. (explaining that police officers were now "free to stop citizens primarily to conduct
an unconstitutional speculative investigation as long as they can claim there was an
independent secondary reason for the seizure").
120. See infra notes 124-29 and accompanying text.
121. See infra notes 124-29 and accompanying text.
122. See infra notes 124-29 and accompanying text (citing many studies showing that
underlying rates of offending likely do not explain differences observed in lawenforcement behavior).
123. See, e.g., infra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
124. Rudovsky, supra note 14, at 299-306 (providing a detailed summary of the then-existing
literature on racial profiling).
125. PETER VERNIERO & PAUL H. ZOUBEK, INTERIM REPORT OF THE STATE POLICE REVIEW
TEAM REGARDING
ALLEGATIONS
OF RACIAL PROFILING 26-28,
111 (1999),

https://perma.cc/87SU-TCLV (finding that 77.2% of all searches in the data involved
Black or Hispanic drivers and generally evaluating the evidence for racial profiling in
traffic stops).
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Illinois State Police, 126 Philadelphia Police Department, 127 New York City
Police Department (NYPD), 128 and Boston Police Department 129 all showed
evidence of racial profiling by law enforcement. Indeed, Rudovsky's summary
from two decades ago foreshadowed a research field that has since grown
substantially. Today, racial-profiling research is a major field of study, with
academics, 130 government agencies, 13 1 and nonprofits 132 all regularly
producing studies. These studies have attempted to document the presence of
racial profiling through a relatively common set of methodological
approaches. They often collect data on the frequency of police stops and
searches of white and nonwhite drivers. 133 They then generally compare these
stop and search rates with some baseline to determine whether police are
treating drivers of color differently than we would expect given the
underlying population breakdowns, rates of traffic-code violations, or other
reference points. 134

126. Harris, supra note 73 (finding that although Latinos made up less than 8% of the Illinois
population and less than 3% of the motorists in the state, they made up 30% of the
motorists stopped by drug-interdiction officers).
127. Rudovsky, supra note 14, at 301 (pointing out how in predominantly white police
districts of Philadelphia, African Americans were roughly ten times more likely to be
stopped through either vehicle or pedestrian stops than one would expect based on
their representation in the underlying population).
128. Id. at 302 (explaining how a 1999 analysis by the New York Attorney General of
175,000 pedestrian stops found that African Americans were approximately six times
more likely to be stopped than whites, and that these imbalances were still statistically
significant after adjusting for crime rates by race).
129. Id. at 302-03 (describing how Boston Police Department officers engaged in racially
biased stops and searches of minority individuals).
130. See, e.g., infra notes 140-48 and accompanying text.
131. See, e.g., supra note 125 and accompanying text; Vehicle Stops Report: 2020 Vehicle Stop
Report Changes, Mo. ATT'Y GEN., https://perma.cc/HS2U-GSMC (archived Feb. 22,
2021) (providing annual reports on the racial breakdown of vehicle stops in Missouri).
See generally ANNUAL REPORT 2020, CAL. RACIAL & IDENTITY PROFILING BD. (2020),

https://perma.cc/RA4T-JQ3Y (providing a comprehensive analysis of evidence of
racial bias in policing behavior in California).
132. See, e.g., supra note 126 and accompanying text; R.I. AFFILIATE ACLU, THE PERSISTENCE
OF

RACIAL

PROFILING

IN

RHODE

ISLAND:

A

CALL

FOR

ACTION

3-6

(2007),

https://perma.cc/HT4T-TJ7R (presenting evidence of possible racial bias by Rhode
Island police); ACLU & ACLU OF FLA., RACIAL DISPARITIES IN FLORIDA SAFETY BELT

LAW ENFORCEMENT 1-3 (2016), https://perma.cc/2FD2-VH6V (finding evidence of
racial disparities in seat-belt enforcement in Florida).
133. See, e.g., supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
134. See, e.g., infra notes 135-42 and accompanying text.
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In doing so, many studies have struggled with a common methodological
limitation: the so-called "benchmark" problem. 135 Lorie Fridell, in a report
authored in conjunction with the Police Executive Research Forum and
funded by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of Community Oriented
Policing Services, described "the benchmarking challenge" as follows:
Jurisdictions collecting police-citizen contact data are calling upon social science
to determine whether there is a cause-and-effect relationship between a driver's
race/ethnicity and vehicle stopping behavior by police. In analyzing the data,
researchers have attempted to develop comparison groups to produce a
"benchmark" against which to measure their stop data. If an agency determines
that, say, 25 percent of its vehicle stops are of racial/ethnic minorities, to what
should this be compared? In other words, what percentage would indicate racially
13 6
biased policing? This is the question at the core of benchmarking.

Another example may best illustrate this problem. In Floyd v. City of New
York, a group of plaintiffs argued that the NYPD was engaged in a pattern of
stops and frisks that failed to meet the constitutional standards articulated in
Terry v. Ohio.137 To demonstrate a pattern of unconstitutional misconduct, the
plaintiffs pointed to the vast overrepresentation of Black and Latino young
men among the population of those subjected to Terry stops relative to the
city's overall population. 138 But the NYPD denied wrongdoing and argued that
Black and Latino young men would be subject to a disproportionate number of
Terry stops even without racial discrimination. It claimed that there were
higher rates of criminal activity among those racial groups, and that the NYPD
had made a tactical choice to allocate more officers to higher-crime

135. Jeffrey Grogger & Greg Ridgeway, Testing for Racial Profiling in Traffic Stops from
Behind a Veil of Darkness, 101 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 878, 878 (2006) ("[T]he key empirical
problem in testing for racial profiling [is] measuring the risk set, or the 'benchmark,'
against which to compare the racial distribution of traffic stops."). David A. Harris
provides a detailed and careful examination of how prior researchers have dealt with
the benchmark issue. He notes that many early researchers simply used the "easiest,"
the "most widely available," or the "cheapest" benchmark data available-often census
information. David A. Harris, U.S. Experiences with Racial and Ethnic Profiling: History,
Current Issues, and the Future, 14 CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 213, 230 (2006). But these
benchmarks fail to consider potential differences in the underlying behavior of the
populations studied. Census data may also be problematic for studies of racial profiling
in traffic stops because the racial breakdown of a community may not match the racial
breakdown of those driving within that community. See id. at 213, 229-33 (describing
the benchmarking issue and providing a detailed assessment of the literature on this
issue).
136. LORIE FRIDELL, BY THE NUMBERS: A GUIDE FOR ANALYZING RACE DATA FROM VEHICLE

STOPS 7 (2004), https://perma.cc/WZ8A-2KK2.
137. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 556, 558-59 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (describing
the circumstances that led to the litigation); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
138. Floyd, 959 F. Supp. at 583-89 (describing the "competing benchmarks" used by each side
during the litigation).
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communities where more Blacks and Latinos lived relative to other racial
groups. 139 So in deciding whether Blacks and Latinos were overrepresented
among those targeted for stops and frisks, the NYPD asserted that the right
comparison point was not the proportion of New York City's population that
Black and Latino young men composed, but rather the rates at which various
races appeared in suspect descriptions from crime victims.
Identifying the appropriate "benchmark" for comparison is critical in
evaluating whether the resulting statistical disparities in police behavior are
the result of racial profiling by law-enforcement officers or the result of
genuine differences in underlying behavior. 140 This benchmark problem has
complicated efforts by litigants, including the DOJ, to make legally sufficient
showings of racial bias in court proceedings against local law-enforcement
agencies. 141 As one researcher known for her skepticism of racial-profiling
studies critically remarked on traffic enforcement, "[u]ntil someone devises an
adequately sophisticated benchmark that takes into account population
patterns on the roads, degrees of law breaking, police deployment patterns, and
the nuances of police decision making, stop data are as meaningless as they are
politically explosive." 142 To address these benchmarking challenges, traffic
studies have taken a number of different methodological approaches.
Some studies have simply compared the rate at which police stop and
search the vehicles of drivers of color with the underlying population of a

139. Id. at 584 ("The City's experts, by contrast, used a benchmark consisting of the rates at
which various races appear in suspect descriptions from crime victims-in other
words, 'suspect race description data.' The City's experts assumed that if officers' stop
decisions were racially unbiased, then the racial distribution of stopped pedestrians
would be the same as the racial distribution of the criminal suspects in the area."
(footnote omitted) (quoting the defendant's expert report)).
140. For a broader discussion of the benchmark problem in the context of traffic stops, see
Grogger & Ridgeway, supra note 135, at 878 (concluding that benchmarks based on
residential population may result in a poor or imprecise estimate of the population of
drivers on the road violating traffic laws).
141. The benchmark problem has been problematic in cases where the DOJ has attempted
to prove racial bias in traffic stops under 34 U.S.C. § 12601, which allows the Attorney
General to sue local law-enforcement agencies for engaging in a pattern or practice of
unlawful or unconstitutional conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 122 F. Supp. 3d
272, 331-38 (M.D.N.C. 2015) (describing why the district court ultimately concluded
that Dr. John Lamberth's use of an observational study to establish a benchmark for
racial-profiling analysis was inadmissible under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and, regardless, lacked credibility in the eyes of the court).
142. Brian L. Withrow & Howard Williams, Proposinga Benchmark Based on Vehicle Collision
Data in Racial Profiling Research, 40 CRIM. JUST. REv. 449, 451 (2015) (quoting HEATHER
MAC DONALD, ARE COPS RACIST? HOW THE WAR AGAINST THE POLICE HARMS BLACK
AMERICANS 22 (2003)).
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geographical area 143 or with the racial distribution of licensed drivers. 144 Other
studies have compared the rate at which police stop and search drivers of color
with the rate at which those same drivers appear to violate traffic laws, relying
on systematic field observations or self-reported surveys to establish a
benchmark.1 45 Still others have developed a benchmark by relying on vehicle-

143. See, e.g., Michael R. Smith & Matthew Petrocelli, Racial Profiling? A Multivariate Analysis
of Police Traffic Stop Data, 4 POLICE Q. 4, 8-17 (2001) (comparing the number of Black
individuals stopped in Richmond, Virginia, with their percentage of the drivingeligible population and finding apparent evidence of racial profiling); FRIDELL, supra
note 136, at 75-113 (describing the benchmark challenge and identifying "adjusted
census data" as one possible way to establish a benchmark).
144. William R. Smith, Donald Tomaskovic-Devey, Matthew T. Zingraff, H. Marcinda
Mason, Patricia Y. Warren, Cynthia Pfaff Wright, Harvey McMurray & C. Robert
Fenlon, The North Carolina Highway Traffic Study 6 (U.S. Dep't of Just., Working Paper
No. 204021, 2004), https://perma.cc/ALS9-H8F5 ("Somewhat to our surprise, we found
empirical evidence to the effect that there is also racial variation by time of day in the
distribution of drivers on the highways of North Carolina. African Americans are
more likely to be driving in the evening and early morning hours relative to their
distribution in the licensed driver population." (emphasis added)).
145. For example, John Lamberth has conducted numerous studies using this methodology
in jurisdictions like Maryland, New Jersey, and Alamance County, North Carolina. See,
e.g., Johnson, 122 F. Supp. 3d at 304-07; Report of John Lamberth, Ph.D. at 2-4, Wilkins v.
Md. State Police, No. 93-cv-00468 (D. Md. Nov. 8, 1996); John Lamberth, Driving While
Black, WASH. POST (Aug. 16, 1998), https://perma.cc/9BSF-36N4 (describing Lambert's
use of this methodology for benchmarking in litigation against the New Jersey State
Police). A number of other researchers have similarly used field-observation
benchmarks to demonstrate a pattern of racial bias by police officers in traffic stops,
commonly finding evidence of racial profiling. For an example of a study that has
relied on Lamberth's benchmarking process, see Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y.
Barnes, Road Work- Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction on the Highway, 101 MICH. L.
REv. 651, 664 (2002). In that study, Gross and Barnes examined Maryland State Police
data from stops and searches conducted on Interstate 95 between 1995 and the mid2000s. Id. at 658. At the time of their study, Gross and Barnes claimed that Maryland
State Police were the only major agency to make this kind of data publicly available for
review. Id. ("There is only one American jurisdiction for which detailed data on racial
profiling in highway searches are available for a considerable period. Since January
1995, Maryland State Police ... troopers have been under court order to file a report on
every incident in which they stop and search a motor vehicle, including information
on the race of the driver, the basis for the search, and the type and quantity of the drugs
recovered, if any."). By analyzing a dataset of 2,146 searches that occurred on a portion
of Interstate 95 from Baltimore to the Delaware border, Gross and Barnes found that
the Maryland State Police engaged in racial profiling by stopping and searching cars
with Black and Hispanic drivers more often than cars with white drivers. Id. at 658-60;
see also Patricia Warren, Donald Tomaskovic-Devey, William Smith, Matthew
Zingraff & Marcinda Mason, Driving While Black: Bias Processes and Racial Disparity in
Police Stops, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 709, 712 (2006) (noting that "[s]urveys offer an alternative
to official records," as they "allow for data that are unlikely to be available in official
reports to be collected and analyzed," and describing how the authors use "self-reported
driving behavior and past vehicle stops to statistically control for law-breaking
behavior").
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collision data, arguing that this collision data provide better insight into the
racial breakdown of drivers on the road than population data alone. 146
Another group of studies has attempted to circumvent the benchmark problem
not by focusing on the comparative rate of stops and searches of drivers of
color relative to a benchmark, but instead by comparing differential rates at
which police search the vehicles of drivers of color and the rate at which these
searches result in the collection of contraband. 147 And an emerging set of
studies has adopted a "veil-of-darkness" methodology that compares the rate at
which police stop white and nonwhite drivers at day and at night, under the
assumption that evidence of racial profiling will be most evident during
daylight hours when police can more easily ascertain the race of nearby
drivers. 148
146. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Alpert, Michael R. Smith & Roger G. Dunham, Toward a Better
Benchmark: Assessing the Utility of Not-at-Fault Traffic Crash Data in Racial Profiling
Research, JUST. RSCH. & POL'Y, Spring 2004, at 43, 56-63 (arguing that traffic-crash data
can be a useful tool for establishing a benchmark and using Miami-Dade County,
Florida, as an example for implementing this methodology); Withrow & Williams,
supra note 142, at 464 (arguing that this type of benchmark is more reliable than
alternatives).
147. See generally George E. Higgins, Gennaro F. Vito & William F. Walsh, Searches: An
Understudied Area of Racial Profiling, 6 J. ETHNICITY CRIM. JUST. 23, 28-29, 37 (2008)
(using data from more than 36,000 traffic stops in Louisville, Kentucky, to show that
race appeared to influence the likelihood of searches taking place after a traffic stop).
As another example, Frank R. Baumgartner and others have shown through an
analysis of 18 million traffic stops in North Carolina between 2002 and 2013 that Black
drivers, particularly younger Black men, are disproportionately likely to be searched
and arrested incident to a traffic stop. See Frank R. Baumgartner, Derek A. Epp, Kelsey
Shoub & Bayard Love, Targeting Young Men of Color for Search and Arrest During Traffic
Stops: Evidence from North Carolina, 2002-2013, 5 POL. GRPS. & IDENTITIES 107, 112, 117-19
(2017) [hereinafter Baumgartner et al., Young Men of Color] (conducting the analysis
described and discussing the hit rate for these searches). Baumgartner and others have
found similar patterns in data from the Texas Department of Public Safety from 2003
through 2014. FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER, BRYAN D. JONES, JULIO ZACONET, COLIN
WILSON & ARVIND KRISHNAMURTHY, RACIAL DISPARITIES IN TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF

PUBLIC SAFETY TRAFFIC STOPS, 2002-2014, at 1-2 (2015), https://perma.cc/E55C-NV7R.
148. Grogger & Ridgeway, supra note 135, at 878-79 (using a veil-of-darkness methodology
to examine whether the Oakland Police Department engaged "inracial profiling when
selecting particular vehicles to stop"). For more discussions and examples of the veil-ofdarkness methodology, see Joseph A. Ritter & David Bael, Detecting Racial Profiling in
Minneapolis Traffic Stops: A New Approach, CURA REP., Spring/Summer 2009, at 11, 11
(using a veil-of-darkness methodology to analyze racial profiling in Minneapolis);
Robert E. Worden, Sarah J. McLean & Andrew P. Wheeler, Testing for Racial Profiling
with the Veil-of-Darkness Method, 15 POLICE Q. 92, 93, 105 (2012) (using the veil-ofdarkness methodology to find no evidence of racial bias in Syracuse, New York); and
William C. Horrace & Shawn M. Rohlin, How Dark Is Dark? Bright Lights, Big City,
Racial Profiling, 98 REv. ECON. & STAT. 226, 227, 231 (2016) (redefining the parameters
for a veil-of-darkness analysis in Syracuse, New York, and finding evidence that Black
drivers were being stopped 15% more during daylight compared to darkness hours). It
is also worth noting that police administrative records can conceal the presence of
footnote continued on next page
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Admittedly, this brief survey only scratches the surface of the evidence of
racial profiling that surfaced in the years before and after the Whren
decision. 149 Even so, a couple of important lessons emerge. First, scholars using
a wide variety of methodological techniques have found evidence of racial
profiling in police agencies across the country. This is not to say that all police
departments are equal, or that all departments demonstrate troubling patterns
of racial bias. There are around 18,000 police departments in the United States,
each with its own unique policies, procedures, and culture. 150 The nation is not
policed by one police department, but by thousands of decentralized
agencies. 151 Nevertheless, the existing literature suggests that racial profiling
by police is a relatively common occurrence across a number of American
police departments.
Second, while these studies frequently cite Whren as one of the causal
mechanisms that may be contributing to the prevalence of racial profiling by
law enforcement, none of these studies have causally connected Whren or
similar cases to the patterns they observe. Take, for example, the
comprehensive study of North Carolina traffic-stop data conducted by Frank
Baumgartner, Derek Epp, Kelsey Shoub, and Bayard Love in 2016.152 In their
discussion of the potential root causes of racial profiling, they argue:
[T]he Supreme Court decided in Whren v. United States (1996) that any traffic
violation was a legitimate reason to stop a driver, even if the purported violation
(e.g. changing lanes without signaling) was clearly a pretext for the officer's desire
to stop and search the vehicle for other reasons, such as a general suspicion. There
was no requirement that speeding laws, for example, be equitably enforced; if all
drivers are speeding, it is constitutionally permissible, said the Justices, to pick
out just the minority drivers and enforce the speeding laws selectively. Of course,
once a car is stopped, officers are able to conduct a "consent" search when drivers
do not object to the officer's request to search the vehicle. The Whren decision
opened the floodgates to pretextual stops. Thus, tens of thousands of black and

&

underlying racial bias by law enforcement. See generally Dean Knox, Will Lowe
Jonathan Mummolo, Administrative Records Mask Racially Biased Policing, 114 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 619 (2020) (arguing that administrative records of police behavior can often
mask the presence of racial bias and outlining alternative methods for addressing this
problem).
149. For a list of references to prior research on this topic, see FRIDELL, supra note 136, at
423-37.
150. See BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., NCJ 233982, CENSUS OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, 2008, at 2 (2011), https://perma.cc/PG66-3J5E (reporting that

there were nearly 18,000 state and local law-enforcement agencies in 2008).
151. Stephen Rushin, Using Data to Reduce Police Violence, 57 B.C. L. REV. 117, 139-42 (2016).
152. Baumgartner et al., Young Men of Color, supra note 147, at 108.

663

An Empirical Assessment of Pretextual Stops and Racial Profiling
73 STAN. L. REV. 637 (2021)
brown drivers have routinely been stopped and searched in an effort to reduce
15 3
drug use.

While this seems like an intuitive conclusion, existing studies have struggled
to prove it empirically. As we explain in the next Part, we believe that our
study begins to fill this gap in the existing literature.
III. The Effects of Arreola on Police Behavior
In the wake of Whren, scholars expressed widespread concern that by
green-lighting pretextual traffic stops, the Supreme Court had inadvertently
facilitated racial profiling. 154 Demonstrating this proposition quantitatively
has proven difficult, however, for two primary reasons. First-at least
according to our examination of the existing literature and case law-there is a
lack of widespread, historical variation in pretextual stop policies across
jurisdictions. Thus, it is not clear that the Supreme Court's decision in Whren
acted as an exogenous shock. Instead, it may have actually validated practices
already common among many police departments. This means that even if
data were widely available on police stops, it is not clear that we could measure
the effect of Whren on racial profiling, as it may not have actually changed
many departments' policing practices.
Second, empirically evaluating the effects of pretextual-stop doctrines has
proven challenging because of a lack of comprehensive data on police
behavior. Only recently have some states required police departments to keep
data on traffic and pedestrian stops, including the race of those individuals
stopped. 155 Such laws remain relatively rare today.156 When the Court handed

153. Id. Although Baumgartner et al. cited Whren as a case that may contribute to racial
profiling, they did not establish a causal link between pretextual stops and racial

profiling.
154. See supra Part I.B.
155. See, e.g., Matt Kiefer, Police in Illinois Will Permanently Have to Record Race, Other Traffic
Stop Data in New Bill, CHI. REP. (May 23, 2019), https://perma.cc/P9AQ-55UB ("The
Illinois Traffic Stop Study-launched 15 years ago under legislation sponsored by thenState Sen. Barack Obama-requires police officers to record key data points during
every traffic stop, including the reason for the stop, the race of the driver and outcomes
that may include warnings, tickets and searches."); John Sides, What Data on 20 Million
Traffic Stops Can Tell Us About "Driving While Black," CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (July 17,
2018, 2:55 PM), https://perma.cc/VS7H-4WPX (to locate, click "View the live page")
("North Carolina became the first state to mandate the collection of traffic stops [sic]
data in 1999, thanks in large part to efforts by black representatives in the state
legislature.").
156. ACLU of Ill., Vote Yes on HB 1613, at 1 (2019), https://perma.cc/XRM9-Q89L ("Of the
15 states with data collection laws, 13 are permanent. IL and MD are the only 2 with
temporary laws.").
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down Whren in 1996, such data was scarcely available, 157 and the federal
government has never kept national data on police traffic stops or the race of
those stopped by law enforcement. 158 Combined, this lack of data and the lack
of jurisdictional variation have meant that scholars can only hypothesize about
the potentially harmful effects of Whren on racial minorities.
As described in Part I, at least two states-New Mexico 1 59 and
Washington 160 -have acted to limit police use of pretextual stops. Of these two
states, only Washington-with its progression from Ladson to Arreola-has
both the doctrinal variation and available data necessary to test the effect of
pretextual-stop doctrines on the racial disparities in traffic stops by police
officers. The next Subpart lays out our research model.
A.

Study Design

Table 1 illustrates the legality of pretextual stops and other similar forms
of traffic stops in Washington over time.
Table1
Legality of Pretextual Stops in Washington over Time (1999-Present)

1999-2012

Pretextual st ops
unconst it utional under
Ladson

2012-present

2013

Mixed-motive stops
permissible under Arreola

Officers trained in the use
of mixed-motive stops

As Table 1 shows, the Washington Supreme Court banned the use of
pretextual stops between 1999 and 2012. Then, in December 2012, the
Washington Supreme Court authorized a form of mixed-motive stops that
closely resembles pretextual stops. 161 However, we are primarily interested not
in the date that the Washington Supreme Court handed down Arreola, but in
the dates on which officers in Washington received training in the use of
mixed-motive stops.
157. Sides, supra note 155 (quoting Baumgartner and his coauthors for the proposition that
North Carolina was the first state with a comprehensive data-collection law passed in
1999-three years after Whren).
158. Rushin, supra note 151, at 117-18 (describing how the federal government keeps very
few statistics on police behavior, including major subjects like the number of
individuals killed by law enforcement each year).
159. See Sievers, supra note 78, at 595-601 (describing the New Mexico departure from
Whren).
160. See supra Parts I.C.1-.2 and accompanying text.
161. State v. Arreola, 290 P.3d 983, 991 (Wash. 2012) (en banc).
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To gain some insight into these matters, we turn to data from the
Washington State Criminal Justice Training Commission (WSCJTC), an
organization "created in 1974 to establish standards and provide training to
criminal justice professionals, including peace officers." 162 Washington is
unique among most American states in that officers across the state receive
consistent training via the WSCJTC. 163 Additionally, under Washington law,
all law-enforcement officers in the State of Washington must undergo twentyfour hours of mandatory in-service training each year. 164 The WSCJTC
provides information to law-enforcement officers and agencies on new court
rulings through the publication of monthly law-enforcement digests. 165 And
each year, the WSCJTC updates a comprehensive Law Enforcement Legal
Update Outline, which summarizes all case law "on arrest, search, seizure, and
other topical areas of interest to law-enforcement officers; plus a chronology
of independent grounds rulings under Article I, Section 7 of the Washington
Constitution." 166
In the years between the Ladson and the Arreola decisions, these training
materials advised officers about the ban on pretextual stops. 167 Even in cases
from other states in which litigants had not directly challenged stops as
pretextual-like the case in which a gang unit executed a traffic stop and asked
about the driver's possible gang affiliation-the Commission went out of its
way to warn officers that "there is [a] substantial chance that Washington
courts would find [the stop] to be pretextual under the Washington

162. About the Commission: Training the Guardians of Democracy, WASH. ST. CRIM. JUST.
TRAINING COMM'N, https://perma.cc/98MG-H2KJ (archived Jan. 6, 2021).
163.

Id.

164. Training & Education: Mandated 24-Hour In-Service Audit,
TRAINING COMM'N, https://perma.cc/XRX5-8339 (archived
statutory requirements established by Washington law).
requirement went into effect in 2006, and thus covers our
interest (the period immediately after A rreola). Id.

WASH. ST. CRIM. JUST.

Jan. 6, 2021) (citing the
The in-service training
primary time period of

165. Resources: Law Enforcement Digests, WASH. ST. CRIM. JUST. TRAINING COMM'N,
https://perma.cc/DRK2-VBJK (archived Jan. 6, 2021).
166. Id. (noting that the most recent version of this annual document went live on July 1,
2020, and stating that the document is updated "at least once each year").
167. See

JOHN

R.

WASBERG,

WASH.

STATE

CRIM. JUST.

TRAINING

COMM'N,

LAW

ENFORCEMENT LEGAL UPDATE OUTLINE 10-11 (2020), https://perma.cc/K5R9-WVPR
(noting that the Law Enforcement Legal Update Outline first incorporated a warning
about the Ladson holding in September 1999 and framing Ladson as a prohibition on
pretextual stops); WASH. STATE CRIM. JUST. TRAINING COMM'N, LAW ENFORCEMENT

DIGEST: AUGUST 2012, at 7 (2012), https://perma.cc/WJ4E-BDRH (citing Ladson and
explaining that if a federal case had been "tried under the Washington constitution,
article I, section 7, the pretext stop . . . would have tainted the evidence obtained in
subsequent police action at the scene of the stop").
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constitution." 168 After the Washington Supreme Court decided Arreola,
discussion of the case first appeared in the monthly law-enforcement digest
approximately three months later, in March 2013.169 It then presumably
appeared in the annual Law Enforcement Legal Update Outline later that year
in July 2013 (and it remains in the most recent version of this document,
published in July 2020).170
Admittedly, we cannot precisely pinpoint the moment when all or most
troopers in the Washington State Patrol became familiar with the mixedmotive-stop doctrine established by Arreola. The existing evidence on training
leads us to hypothesize that Arreola may have had some immediate effect upon
the behavior of officers aware of the decision in December 2012. But we think
it is possible that the full effect of Arreolamay not have been felt until as long as
a full year or more after the decision-that is, after the WSCJTC and the
Washington State Patrol had fully incorporated the decision into their
training materials, and after all officers had presumably completed their
statutorily required twenty-four hours of annual in-service training for 2013.
As discussed in later Subparts, we employ our models under various
assumptions related to the time at which officers learned how to employ
mixed-motive stops.
B.

Dataset

The Stanford Open Policing Project has made available online extensive
amounts of data on police traffic stops (among other datasets) from
departments across the country. 17 1 We draw on data provided by this database
for the Washington State Patrol. 172 The Washington State Patrol is the

168. WASH. STATE CRIM. JUST. TRAINING COMM'N, LAW ENFORCEMENT DIGEST: MARCH 2009,

at 3-4 (2009), https://perma.cc/U249-6QVS.
169. See WASBERG, supranote 167, at 11. We ascertained the date of Arreola's first appearance
because the Law Enforcement Legal Update Outline operates as a historical document
that notes the month and year in which an opinion was added. In the section on
pretextual stops, the outline notes the holding of Arreola and states that it first
appeared in the March 2013 issue of the law-enforcement digest. Id. at i, 11, 63.
170. Id. at i, 11, 63 (noting that the 2019 and 2020 versions were published on July 1 of those
years).
171. Data, STAN. OPEN POLICING PROJECT, https://perma.cc/86JV-NLFU (archived Jan. 6,
2021) (providing datasets for Washington, including for the Washington State Patrol,
Seattle, and Tacoma); see also Emma Pierson, Camelia Simoiu, Jan Overgoor, Sam
Corbett-Davies, Daniel Jenson, Amy Shoemaker, Vignesh Ramachandran, Phoebe
Barghouty, Cheryl Phillips, Ravi Shroff & Sharad Goel, A Large-Scale Analysis of Racial
Disparities in Police Stops Across the United States, 4 NATURE: HUM. BEHAV. 736, 736-37
(2020) (presenting the analysis that resulted from data collection by Stanford Open
Policing Project researchers).
172. Data, supranote 171.

667

An Empirical Assessment of Pretextual Stops and Racial Profiling
73 STAN. L. REV. 637 (2021)

primary state policing agency for Washington and employs around 1,100
troopers whose primary responsibilities include "provid[ing] a safe motoring
environment for all Washingtonians" on the "17,524 miles of the state's
highways" as well as interstates.1 73
The dataset we examine includes 8,257,527 stops made by troopers of the
Washington State Patrol from December 2008 through December 2015.174 It
includes data on the date, time, and location of each stop.175 It also includes data
on the race, age, and sex of each driver, as well as data on whether the officer
conducted a search after the stop, whether this search resulted in the collection
of any contraband, whether the officer issued a citation, whether the officer
issued a warning, and whether the officer performed a frisk of any suspect. 176
The availability of data from multiple years before and after December 2012
allows us to examine the effects of the Arreola decision.
The Washington State Patrol reports the race of drivers using five
different racial classifications: White, Black, Hispanic, Asian/Pacific Islander,
and Other. If an officer fails to select one of these racial identifiers, then the
database categorizes the race of the driver as unavailable, or "n/a."177 This
raises an immediate methodological challenge: How should we handle cases
where officers fail to list the race of the driver? This is a particularly
challenging question because an officer's decision to not report the race of a
driver during a traffic stop may not be random. It may even be done in an
effort to avoid the detection of a pattern of stopping drivers of color. 178 Media
reports 179 and prior scholarly examinations 180 of the Washington State Patrol
173. About Us, supra note 22; Driver, WASH. ST. PATROL, https://perma.cc/9LF4-S9K8
(archived Jan. 6, 2021).
174. Data, supranote 171.
175.

Id.

176. Id. We would have
these agencies also
were unable to use
on the driver's race

preferred to have used data from Seattle and Tacoma as well, since
provided datasets to the Stanford Open Policing Project. But we
data from these two agencies, as they did not include information
or whether searches were conducted. Id.

177. Around 26% of stops by the Washington State Patrol fail to list the race of the driver.
178. See generally Elizabeth Luh, Not So Black and White: Uncovering Racial Bias from
Systematically Misreported Trooper Reports (Apr. 30, 2020) (unpublished manuscript),
https://perma.cc/9WX2-5ZLB (finding compelling evidence that officers in Texas
systematically misreported race to avoid bias detection).
179. See, e.g., Jason Buch & Joy Borkholder, Native American Drivers Are More Likely to Be
Searched by Washington State Patrol, CROSSCUT (Dec. 19, 2019), https://perma.cc/RD3ZW8RF ("Some troopers were disciplined for refusing to accurately record data,
according to a 2015 training presentation to State Patrol cadets....").

J.

&

180. NICHOLAS P. LOVRICH, MICHAEL
GAFFNEY, CLAYTON MOSHER, MITCHELL PICKERILL
TRAVIS C. PRATT, WASH. STATE UNIV., ANALYSIS OF TRAFFIC STOP DATA COLLECTED BY
THE WASHINGTON STATE PATROL: ASSESSMENT OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC EQUITY AND BIAS
IN STOPS, CITATIONS, AND SEARCHES USING MULTIVARIATE QUANTITATIVE AND MULTI-

footnote continued on next page
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have noted that officers have faced discipline and accusations of wrongdoing
for failing to properly document the race of drivers. Based on the available
research on intentional racial misidentification of drivers by police officers
during traffic stops, we believe it is important to account for the very real
possibility that officers may use these "n/a" cases to systematically conceal
stops of drivers of color. Thus, as we explain in more detail in the next
Subpart, we chose to run all of our analyses both with and without the
inclusion of these "n/a"cases in our definition of nonwhite drivers. 18 1
Both approaches produced substantially similar results. Regardless of
whether we include "n/a"cases in or exclude "n/a" cases from our definition of
nonwhite drivers, we still find that the introduction of Arreola is associated
with a statistically significant increase in traffic stops of these drivers. We also
find Arreola to be associated with statistically significant increases in stops of
Black drivers, Hispanic drivers, and drivers of "other" races relative to white
drivers, even when we exclude both "n/a" cases and all other nonwhite races
from our analysis. Put simply, whether we aggregate all nonwhite groups or
we analyze them separately, our results do not change much.
In analyzing this dataset, we faced another methodological challenge:
Should we look at the raw number of stops of each racial group, or should we
attempt to convert these raw stop numbers into rates of stops per capita? We
made the purposeful choice not to convert the dataset from raw stop numbers
into rates of stops per capita. If we converted these numbers into per capita
rates, we would need to know two pieces of information: (1) the number of
stops of each racial subgroup by county (or some other geographical or
jurisdictional area); and (2) the number of drivers of each racial group on roads
policed by the Washington State Patrol in that county (or geographical or
jurisdictional area). While we have self-reported data from the Washington
State Patrol on (1), we lack data for (2). As previously addressed in Part II,
METHOD QUALITATIVE RESEARCH TECHNIQUES 5 (2005), https://perma.cc/G2TY-4CGY

(explaining the authors' decision to conduct an analysis of stop records by comparing
records to photographs from the Department of Licensing offices, and acknowledging
that the authors' decision to conduct this analysis was in part motivated by media
reports that some troopers may be "systematically" misclassifying the race of minority
drivers).
181. Stated another way, we first ran all of our models throughout the paper with the "n/a"
cases removed entirely from the dataset. This approach focuses our analysis exclusively
on cases where state troopers selected one of the racial identifiers. While this sidesteps
the "n/a" problem, we also recognize that it may fail to consider a number of stops of
drivers of color. Because officers may attempt to use the "n/a"classification to conceal
unusually frequent stops of drivers of color, we alternatively characterized "n/a" cases
as being drivers of color and reran all of our analyses. Both methodologies produced
largely similar, statistically significant results. Where the inclusion or exclusion of
"n/a" cases affected the results, we explain these differences. Alternative specifications
of our models are available in Parts B and C of the Appendix.
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scholars have widely debated the best way to address this so-called benchmark
or "denominator"problem. 182
One way to address the benchmark problem would be to rely on U.S.
Census population estimates by county by race by month, under the
assumption that residents of a given county are a close proxy for the drivers on
state and interstate highways in that county policed by the Washington State
Patrol. But this assumption has been proven false in multiple prior studies, as
documented in detail by Geoffrey Alpert, Michael Smith, and Roger
Dunham. 183 In one such study, Joel Miller, Paul Quinton, and Nick Bland used
mounted video cameras to document the ethnicity of drivers in cities in
England. They found that the population and demographic profile of the
drivers in those cities often varied substantially from the census-level
residential population. 184 Howard Greenwald reached a substantially similar
conclusion in his analysis of Sacramento, California, in 2001, finding that in
some areas "minority drivers, observed as a percentage of total observations,
far exceeded their proportions in the corresponding census population," while
in other areas, "the reverse was true and minorities were significantly
underrepresented relative to the census." 185 In Denver between 2001 and 2002,
Deborah Thomas found that only around half of all traffic stops by the Denver
Police Department involved residents of Denver, meaning that using census
data to calculate stop rates would have been "wildly inaccurate."186 Similar
disparities existed when Alpert, Smith, and Dunham compared the observed
race of drivers at various intersections in Miami-Dade County, with the
smallest block and tract census data.187 And in Plano, Texas, a large suburb of
Dallas, researchers found that 79% of all traffic stops within city limits
182. See supra Part II; see also Samuel Walker, Searching for the Denominator: Problems with
Police Traffic Stop Data and an Early Warning System Solution, JUST. RsCH. & POL'Y,
Spring 2001, at 63, 71-73 (discussing how it can be difficult for social-science
researchers to establish a proper baseline in racial-profiling cases).
183. Alpert et al., supra note 146, at 45.
184. Joel Miller, Paul Quinton & Nick Bland, Measuring Stops and Searches: Lessons from U.K.
Home Office Research, JUST. RSCH. & POL'Y, Fall 2002, at 143, 151-52 ("The research shows
that measures of available populations are very different from resident populations (as
measured by the 1991 census).").
185. Alpert et al., supra note 146, at 45; see also HOWARD P. GREENWALD, FINAL REPORT:
POLICE
VEHICLE
STOPS
IN
SACRAMENTO,
CALIFORNIA
38-39
(2001),
https://perma.cc/XS7F-6BFV (comparing census population figures with the observed
races of passing drivers, finding that there is a significant disparity between these
measures, and further finding that around one-third of all drivers on Sacramento roads
are nonresidents). Because of this, the study urges future researchers to act with
"extreme caution" before using census data as a denominator in calculating stop rates.

Id.
186. Alpert et al., supra note 146, at 45.
187. Id.
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involved drivers who were not residents of the city, suggesting the population
demographics of drivers may differ from the demographics of the residential
population.188
This mismatch between residential population and the population of
drivers on roadways may be even more substantial in the case of state and
interstate highways that run through smaller, rural counties to connect major
population centers, tourist attractions, national or state parks, and major
employers. Take, for example, the highly trafficked, 175-mile corridor of
Interstate 5 between Seattle, Washington, and Portland, Oregon, which also
includes other major population hubs like Olympia and Tacoma. 189 This
corridor is so highly trafficked by commuters, businesspeople, and tourists that
lawmakers are examining the introduction of a high-speed railway to
accommodate up to 3 million trips per year by 2040.190 If and until that
happens, many of these travelers navigate Interstate 5, which takes them
through six different counties: King, Pierce, Thurston, Lewis, Cowlitz, and
Clark. 191 Given the frequency of travel between Seattle, Tacoma, Olympia, and
Portland along Interstate 5, there is a high probability that individuals stopped
by the Washington State Patrol along Interstate 5 in rural counties like Lewis
or Cowlitz are actually residents of larger urban counties, like King or Pierce,
or are out-of-state drivers. And given that counties like King have drastically
different demographic profiles from counties like Lewis and Cowlitz, use of
county population as a proxy for driver population may skew the stop data
and future analysis in an unpredictable and unreliable way. 192
188. PLANO POLICE DEP'T, 2019 PLANO POLICE DEPARTMENT RACIAL PROFILING REPORT

5-6

(2019), https://perma.cc/YTB2-YXVF (noting this figure and then developing an
estimate of the demographic profile of drivers, which differs from the demographic
profile of the city's residential population).
189. Gregory Scruggs, The Case for Portland-to-Vancouver High-Speed Rail, BLOOMBERG
CITYLAB (Dec. 4, 2019, 7:15 AM PST), https://perma.cc/FRD6-D43E (identifying the
significance of the Interstate 5 corridor that includes Portland and Seattle, and stating
that "[o]nly 175 miles separate Portland from Seattle"). For a detailed feasibility study
outlining the importance of this corridor and the kinds of individuals who travel along
Interstate 5, see generally WASH. STATE DEP'T OF TRANSP., ULTRA-HIGH-SPEED GROUND
TRANSPORTATION
BUSINESS
CASE
ANALYSIS:
FINAL
REPORT
(2019),

https://perma.cc/B4L5-KQAQ.
190. Scruggs, supranote 189 (citing the 3 million figure).
191. WASH. STATE DEP'T OF TRANSP., supra note 189, app. C at 4 (listing the counties along
this corridor and including the counties listed above); see also Washington Road Map,
MAPPERY, https://perma.cc/E6H7-XGYB (archived Feb. 22, 2021).
192. In fact, a study conducted by the Washington State University faculty recognized this
fact in a report issued in 2005. In explaining why census resident-population estimates
were likely an unreliable benchmark in calculating rates of traffic stops by race, they
explained, "[i]t is also important to note that certain areas of the state (particularly the
Interstate-5 corridor running from the Canadian border to the Oregon border)
patrolled by the WSP have a high proportion of out-of-state drivers, and it is probable
footnote continued on next page
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Alternatively, inclusion of state population numbers to generate stop rates
fails to capture the fact that individuals of color are often less likely to have
driver's licenses, 193 and a substantial number of the travelers on state and
interstate highways are out-of-state residents. 194 The use of state population
numbers also would not account for the fact that the Washington State Patrol
only patrols a small fraction of the state's public roadways. 195 The driver
population on the particular segment of roadways policed by the Washington
State Patrol may systematically differ from the state's driver-age population.
Because of these issues, the National Institute of Justice has bluntly
concluded that "social scientists now disregard comparisons to the census for
assessing racial bias." 196 Alpert, Smith, and Dunham have argued that
"[e]vidence is mounting ... that the census population of an area under study
does not accurately represent the driving population available to be stopped,"
and thus "the use of census data largely ha[s] been discredited." 197 And Greg
Ridgeway and John MacDonald have explained that "[i]t is quite conceivable
that the residential population in many neighborhoods has little resemblance

that these drivers are more likely to be members of racial minority groups than
resident in-state drivers." LOVRICH ET AL., supra note 180, at 13.
193. See VANESSA M. PEREZ, AMERICANS WITH PHOTO ID: A BREAKDOWN OF DEMOGRAPHIC

CHARACTERISTICS 3 (2015), https://perma.cc/96G6-MXAQ (showing the disparities in
the likelihood of having a government-recognized photograph ID among different
races).
194. See, e.g., LOVRICH et al., supra note 180, at 13 (describing in Washington the "high
proportion of out-of-state drivers" along Interstate 5 in particular and how that may be
an important consideration in judging stops made by the Washington State Patrol).
195. The exact percentage of roadways policed by the Washington State Patrol depends on
whether one uses lane miles or centerline miles. Using the former approach, it appears
that the agency is responsible for around 11.2% of the state's lane miles, or 18,699 of
167,542. See About Us, supra note 22; Highway Statistics 2018, FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S.
DEP'T OF TRANSP., https://perma.cc/P7WR-9B7E (last updated Oct. 31, 2019) (finding
167,542 lane miles in Washington). Using the latter approach, the Washington State
Patrol appears to be responsible for policing around 8.7% of the state's centerline miles,
or 7,000 of 80,338. Fed. Highway Admin., Highway Statistics Series: Washington 1
(2015), https://perma.cc/6ZAF-BXUG (providing the 80,338 figure); WASH. STATE
PATROL, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT 14 (2018), https://perma.cc/V3FW-7BZV (estimating
that the Washington State Patrol oversees traffic enforcement on around 7,000
centerline miles).
196. Racial Profiling and Traffic
https://perma.cc/CM7C-U9WK.

Stops,

NAT'L

INST.

JUST.

(Jan.

9,

2013),

197. Alpert et al., supra note 146, at 45; Geoffrey P. Alpert, Roger G. Dunham & Michael R.
Smith, InvestigatingRacial Profiling by the Miami-Dade Police Department: A Multimethod
Approach, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 25, 32 (2007) (explaining that while census
population data had been popular because it is "readily available at little or no cost,"
researchers "quickly reasoned that the static nature of the census did not represent the
fluid nature of those who drove in the same areas").
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to the patterns of people on the street." 198 As discussed earlier, numerous
scholars and experts have proposed alternative denominators for calculating
stop rates like no-fault accident records 199 and visual-observation studies. 200
But we have neither the access to these extensive no-fault accident records nor
the resources to conduct a visual-observation study of drivers on the relatively
small percentage of roads in Washington policed by the Washington State
Patrol.
Ultimately, the inclusion of rates of stops (rather than the number of stops)
is necessary in a study like ours only if the population of those policed by the
Washington State Patrol on state and interstate highways has changed in some
meaningful way between 2008 and 2015. Given the relatively short period of
time we study, we think it is unlikely that the underlying population of
drivers on the roads policed by the Washington State Patrol changed
substantially. At minimum, we think this assumption is more defensible than
the assumption that county or state population (or adjusted census population,
or some other artificially constructed denominator) is an adequate substitute
for the actual driver population along highways and interstates. Thus, we
analyze stop levels rather than stop rates. The next Subpart begins our analysis
of this stop data by examining raw trends and acknowledging additional
methodological limitations.
C.

Trends in the Raw Data

Before exploring the results of our more sophisticated modeling, it is
helpful to examine the trends in the raw data. As a preliminary matter, it is
worth calculating the change in stops before and after Arreola. To do this,
Figures 1 through 7 graph the average number of traffic stops per county of
white drivers (represented with a dashed line) as compared to various
nonwhite drivers in the aggregate and by individual racial subgroups
(represented with a solid line) in Washington in the years immediately before
and after Arreola. To compare trends between the two groups, we plot the
average number of stops per month per county of nonwhite drivers on the
198. Greg Ridgeway & John MacDonald, Methods for Assessing Racially Biased Policing, in
RACE, ETHNICITY, AND POLICING: NEW AND ESSENTIAL READINGS 180, 182 (Stephen K.

Rice & Michael D. White eds., 2010) (further explaining that "benchmarking with
census data does not help us isolate the effect of racial bias from differential exposure
and differential offending," and also noting that "[c]ensus estimates provide only the
racial distribution of residents and not how these numbers vary by time of day,
business attractors such as shopping centers, daily traffic patterns involving
commuters, and so forth").
199. See, e.g., Alpert et al., supra note 197, at 34.
200. See supra note 145 and accompanying text (providing a detailed summary of visualobservation studies and other similar methodologies).

673

An Empirical Assessment of Pretextual Stops and Racial Profiling
73 STAN. L. REV. 637 (2021)

left-hand y-axis, and the average number of stops per month per county of
white drivers on the right-hand y-axis. In some of these figures, we group
together all nonwhite drivers as compared to white drivers. In other figures,
we compare the trends in the number of stops of individual racial subgroups
(for example, Black drivers, Hispanic drivers, and Asian drivers) to trends in
the number of stops of white drivers.201
As discussed in Subpart A above, we also recognize that the effects of
Arreola may not have been immediate. It may have taken time for supervisors
and legal counsel to train officers on this new standard, and it may have taken
time for officers to understand fully how to employ mixed-motive stops. To
address this uncertainty, we draw three different vertical lines to represent
three different points at which the Arreola decision may have started to affect a
substantial number of officers: (A) a line at the date of the Arreola decision in
December 2012; (B) a line at the date that the Arreola decision first appeared in
the WSCJTC law-enforcement digest in March 2013; and (C) a line at
December 2013, signifying the date by which we would expect all or most
officers to have completed their twenty-four-hour annual in-service training
requirement after the Arreola decision.2 02

201. The trends in Figures 1-7 represent the average number of stops across all counties per
month over the time window of our dataset. Though there are multiple acceptable
ways to generate these graphs using any of many available statistical software
packages, we used the lpoly command in Stata, which under the conditions of a zerodegree polynomial and a bandwidth set to one generates average trends across time.
202. See supranote 164 and accompanying text.
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Figure 1
Average Stops per Month: White Drivers and Nonwhite Drivers in Washington,

Excluding Stops Where Race Is Unidentified (2008-2015)
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Figure 2
Average Stops per Month: White Drivers and Nonwhite Drivers in Washington,

Including Stops Where Race Is Unidentified (2008-2015)
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Figure 3
Average Stops per Month: White Drivers and Hispanic Drivers in Washington

(2008-2015)
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Figure 4
Average Stops per Month: White Drivers and Black Drivers in Washington

(2008-2015)
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Figure 5
Average Stops per Month: White Drivers and Asian Drivers in Washington

(2008-2015)
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Figure 6
Average Stops per Month: White Drivers and Drivers of

Other Nonwhite Races in Washington (2008-2015)
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Figure 7
Average Stops per Month: White Drivers and Drivers for Whom

Race Is Unidentified in Washington (2008-2015)
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As the data in Figure 1 illustrates, when we aggregate all nonwhite drivers
together, we see that the number of stops of these drivers appears to grow
relative to the stops of white drivers in the years after Arreola. When we break
down our analysis by race, we see stronger evidence of increasing numbers of
stops of Hispanic drivers after Arreola in Figure 3, with comparatively less
evidence of such an increase among Asian drivers in Figure 5. There is also
some evidence in Figures 1 and 2 that if Arreola had an effect on the behavior of
officers, this effect may have grown somewhat over time-perhaps consistent
with the theory that the effect would increase as officers were fully trained and
understood how to use mixed-motive stops. We also see an increase in the
number of stops of drivers with unidentified races in the years after Arreola in
Figure 7, which could be consistent with the hypothesis that troopers
increasingly failed to document the race of drivers of color when executing
mixed-motive stops after Arreola.203 Thus, these general trend lines provide at
least some possible support for the racial-profiling hypothesis.2 04
One challenge we faced in analyzing this dataset is the change in
recreational-marijuana laws during this same time period. Washington
legalized recreational marijuana around the same time that Arreola was
decided. 205 With marijuana becoming legal, 20 6 police may have changed their
behavior, perhaps by changing the frequency of stops or searches incident to
stops. But even after legalization, questions remained about whether the smell
of marijuana or the suspected presence of marijuana in a vehicle could serve as
the basis for an automobile search. 207 After all, driving under the influence of
marijuana remains illegal, as does possession of large amounts of marijuana. 208

203. See supranotes 178-80 and accompanying text.
204. To be clear, neither this evidence, nor any of the evidence in this Article, can prove any
purposeful targeting of drivers by race. Any disproportionate effect of mixed-motive
stops on drivers of color may be the result of implicit bias rather than any explicit bias.
See generally Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Phillip Atiba Goff, Valerie J. Purdie & Paul G.
Davies, Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOc. PSYCH.
876 (2004) (empirically testing the presence of implicit bias in visual observation);
Kimberly Barsamian Kahn, Phillip Atiba Goff, J. Katherine Lee & Diane Motamed,
Protecting Whiteness: White Phenotypic Racial Stereotypicality Reduces Police Use of Force, 7
SOc. PSYCH. & PERSONALITY SCI. 403 (2016) (finding that racial appearance may influence
police use of force).
205. See Christina Ng, Abby Phillips & Clayton Sandell, Colorado, Washington Become First
States to Legalize Recreational Marijuana, ABC NEwS (Nov. 6, 2012, 8:49 AM),
https://perma.cc/8DNS-TD4F.
206. An Act Relating to Marijuana, 2013 Wash. Sess. Laws 28, 29, 42-44.
207. See Kip Hill, Smell of Pot Can Be Basis for Police Search, SPOKESMAN-REV. (July 27, 2014),
https://perma.cc/N4LR-GDL2.
208. Michael Rubinkam, In Era of Legal Pot, Can Police Still Search Cars Based on Odor?, PBS
NEwSHOUR (Sept. 13, 2019, 12:00 PM EST), https://perma.cc/SV5P-A5SG ("Judges have
also ruled that marijuana odor can be used in conjunction with other factors to support
footnote continued on next page
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So while it seems possible that the legalization of recreational marijuana may
have influenced the number of stops and searches executed by the Washington
State Patrol, officers can still search vehicles in some cases based on a suspicion
of marijuana both before and after legalization. 209 The number of searches of
both white and nonwhite drivers declined throughout this period, which may
be an indication that marijuana legalization had some impact on police
behavior during traffic stops. 210
While marijuana legalization may have had some impact on the behavior
of officers after a traffic stop has been initiated, it is less clear how the
legalization of marijuana impacted the initial decision by officers to execute
traffic stops. We nevertheless take several methodological approaches in the
hopes of disentangling the effect of Arreola on traffic stops from any possible
effect of marijuana legalization. The next Subpart walks through these more
sophisticated methodologies.
D.

Effects of Arreola on Traffic Stops

To evaluate the effects of Arreola on the number of police traffic stops of
drivers of color relative to white drivers, we conduct both an ordinary
difference-in-differences
analysis and a series of more sophisticated
regressions. 211 This methodology calculates the difference in police behavior
toward a treatment group and compares that difference to a baseline difference
from a control group. For example, consistent with the hypothesis advanced
by many scholars and civil rights activists after Whren, it seems plausible that
a search. If the smell is overpowering, for example, an officer might conclude the
motorist has a quantity of cannabis far in excess of what's allowed. Driving under the
influence of marijuana is illegal in all 50 states, so police are free to search the car of a
driver who shows signs of impairment.").
209. Additionally, at least one court has heard an appeal to determine whether a state police
officer in a jurisdiction with legalized recreational marijuana may use the federal
prohibition on marijuana as probable cause to justify an automobile search. See Orin S.
Kerr, Can a State Police Officer Search a Car Based on ProbableCause of a FederalMarijuana
Crime?, REASON (Feb. 17, 2020,2:31 AM), https://perma.cc/SYY2-HYZJ; United States v.
Martinez, 811 F. App'x 396, 397-98 (9th Cir. 2020).
210. In the Appendix below, we provide various figures showing trends in the number of
searches of white and nonwhite drivers. See infra Appendix, Part D.
211. For examples of prior studies using the difference-in-differences methodology, see
Michael Lechner, The Estimation of Causal Effects by Difference-in-Difference Methods, 4
FOUNDS. & TRENDS ECONOMETRICS 165, 168-69 (2010) (providing a review of literature
on the use of difference-in-differences in empirical studies); and Elizabeth A. Stuart,
Haiden A. Huskamp, Kenneth Duckworth, Jeffrey Simmons, Zirui Song, Michael E.
Chernew & Colleen L. Barry, Using Propensity Scores in Difference-in-DifferencesModels to
Estimate the Effects of a Policy Change, 14 HEALTH SERVS. & OUTCOMES RSCH.
METHODOLOGY 166, 167 (2014) (explaining that social scientists employ difference-indifferences methods to evaluate the effect of changes in laws).
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by authorizing pretextual-like stops in Arreola, the Washington Supreme
Court may have facilitated racial profiling.2 12 If this hypothesis is true, we
would expect the introduction of Arreola (the independent variable) to result in
a change in police treatment of drivers of color (the dependent variable). And if
this hypothesis is true, we would expect Arreola to have less of an effect on
police treatment of white drivers.
So, to conduct a simple difference-in-differences analysis, we use changes
in the number of stops of white drivers before and after Arreola as our baseline
(or control group), and we compare this difference to the change in the number
of stops of drivers of color (our treatment group). To formally calculate the
difference-in-differences estimate of Arreola's effect on nonwhite drivers
relative to white drivers, we calculate the following differences:
Model 1
=

(Stops"o"h"'

- Stopsnonwhte

post-Arreola

) - (StopsStopswhte

pre-Arreola)

( ospost-Arreola

pre-Arreola

In conducting these difference-in-differences estimates, we averaged
results across all nonwhite racial identifiers, resulting in an average differencein-differences of around 120 additional stops per county per month of
nonwhite racial subgroups relative to white drivers, excluding "n/a" cases (as
shown in Table 2). We ran separate analyses for each nonwhite racial group.
For example, running this analysis for Black drivers resulted in a differencein-differences of approximately 119 additional stops relative to white drivers
per county per month after Arreola, as shown in Table 3. And running this
same analysis for Hispanic drivers resulted in an additional 127 stops relative
to white drivers per county per month, also shown in Table 3. This number
remains relatively stable (around 121) if we include "n/a" cases as a separate
class of nonwhite drivers, as shown in Table A.2 in the Appendix. This result
suggests that relative to changes in the number of stops of white drivers over
the same time period, the number of stops for each nonwhite racial subgroup
of drivers (Black, Hispanic, Asian/Pacific Islander, and other) appears to have
increased by an average of around 120 stops per county per month after
Arreola. This initial test suggests that Arreola may have had a larger effect on
drivers of color than white drivers. Nevertheless, it does not allow us to make
any causal claims, nor does it allow us to estimate the statistical significance of
our findings because it does not account for confounding factors.
To bolster our analysis, we employ a multiple-regression technique
common for studies that employ a difference-in-differences framework.2 13
212. See supraPart I.B.
213. See, e.g., Griffin Edwards, Stephen Rushin & Joseph Colquitt, The Effects of Voluntary
and Presumptive Sentencing Guidelines, 98 TEX. L. REV. 1, 28-32 (2019) (using differencefootnote continued on next page
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Regressions allow us to both estimate standard errors and include other
measurable factors that may be influencing traffic stops, such as driver age,
officer race, officer gender, stop location, and time since Arreola. Formally, we
estimate:
Model 2

Ok, =

a + dnonwhiteik + pArreola, + (nonwhite

'

Arreolar+OX+ s

The difference-in-differences approach is formalized in regression format
by the inclusion of a dummy variable for the affected group, or nonwhite, which
varies by racial group i and county k; a time dummy variable that flags all
months and years post-Arreola, which varies by time t; and an interaction
between the two, or nonwhite * Arreola, which varies by racial group i and
time t. Additionally, depending on the specification, we include county-level
fixed effects and controls for driver age, officer race, and officer gender, all
encapsulated in vector X. The standard errors for each estimate are two-way
clustered by county and year, and all inferences are based on conventional twotailed tests at normal significance cutoffs. 214
This model allows us to estimate more precisely the relationship between
Arreola and any subsequent changes while controlling for alternative
explanatory variables. Table 2 presents the first results from this difference-indifferences modeling, focusing specifically on the estimated effect of Arreola on
the number of stops conducted by Washington State Patrol troopers of
nonwhite drivers relative to white drivers. The results represent the change in
the average total number of stops of each nonwhite racial subgroup (for
example, Black drivers, Hispanic drivers, Asian drivers, and drivers whose race
was categorized as "other") relative to white drivers per county per month
since Arreola. In this model, a positive number indicates an increase in the
relative number of stops per month and a negative number indicates a decline
in the relative number of stops per month. Table 2 removes all stops where
race is unidentified from the dataset. We reran this analysis including these
unidentified race cases and produced substantially similar results, which are
available in the Appendix. 2 15

&

in-differences frameworks and multiple-regression techniques to estimate the effect of
changes in sentencing guidelines in Alabama on judicial behavior); Stephen Rushin
Griffin Edwards, De-Policing, 102 CORNELL L. REv. 721, 754-58 (2017) [hereinafter
Rushin & Edwards, De-Policing](using this same methodological approach to assess the
influence of federal intervention on crime rates).
214. For a longer discussion of the modeling choices including controls, fixed effects, and
standard errors, see Appendix, Part A below.
215. See infra Appendix, Part B; infra Appendix, Table A.2.
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Table 2
Effect of Arreola on Stops of Nonwhite Drivers Relative to White Drivers,

Excluding Stops Where Race Is Unidentified (2008-2015)
Difference-in-differences regressions

Change in stops of
nonwhitedrivers

NC

120.019
(39.059)

Officer gender

-

Mean driver age

No

-

County-level fixed effects

R-squared

0.288

105.896

Yes

115.;434

(11.95;)

(3-.580)

-22.335**

-8.718**

(6.389)

(2.761)

-1,098.019=
(488.923)

109.179
(132.102)

-822.652

76.804

(433.011)

(144.741)

0.326

0.,36

Note: Stop data is reported per county per month. In all but the last row of this
table, the first value is the regression coefficient, while the second value (in
parentheses) is the standard error of that coefficient. The last row of this table
displays the R-squared value for each regression. N = 15,470. Asterisks indicate
degrees of significance:' p <0.1; " p <0.05; .. p <0.01.
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As seen in Table 2, our model estimates that stops of nonwhite racial
subgroups of drivers per county per month relative to white drivers increased
by a statistically significant margin in the years after Arreola. These results are
statistically significant when we add in both controls and county-level fixed
effects. Group-level fixed effects are essentially a set of dummy variables for
each group-in our case, each county-in the dataset. 2 16 Fixed-effect models are
a common strategy used in empirical work to capture unobserved,
idiosyncratic, time-invariant factors that vary across the group being
studied. 217 This gives us some confidence that Arreola may be contributing to
an uptick in the number of stops of drivers of color relative to white drivers.
Table 2 also reports the results for our set of controls, which include the
mean driver age, officer race, and officer gender. These latter two control
variables are bounded between zero and one in our model (with unconditional
averages of 93% and 96% respectively in the dataset). Thus, in operationalizing
the officer gender and officer race variables, our model estimates the effects of
shifting from zero (all nonwhite or all female officers) to one (all white or all
male officers). In interpreting the results of this regression, it may therefore be
useful to scale these numbers down to represent a more realistic shift in the
racial or gender makeup of the Washington State Patrol. Say that the
percentage of white officers conducting traffic stops shifted by one percentage
point (for example, from 92% to 93%). Based on our model, we would expect
this one-percentage-point shift in the underlying racial makeup of the police
force to be associated with a reduction of 10.98 traffic stops per county per
month. Once we include fixed effects in this model, this shift in the racial
makeup of the force becomes nearly indistinguishable from zero (1.098
additional stops per county per month).
The results from Table 2 assume that officers began employing the new
mixed-motive stop doctrine permitted by Arreola immediately after the
Washington Supreme Court issued its holding in December 2012. But as
discussed in Part C of the Appendix, it seems theoretically plausible that the
effects of Arreola may have been delayed until officers received training in how
to employ these new mixed-motive stops. 2 18 To test this hypothesis, we ran
additional specifications of our model that altered the date of the Arreola
decision to match: (1) the date the opinion first appeared in the WSCJTC
216. See, e.g., JOSHUA D. ANGRIST & JORN-STEFFEN PISCHKE, MOSTLY HARMLESS
ECONOMETRICS: AN EMPIRICIST'S COMPANION 221-27 (2009); Brett Parker, Note, Is Death

Different to FederalJudges? An Empirical Comparison of Capitaland Noncapital Guilt-Phase
Determinations on FederalHabeas Review, 72 STAN. L. REV. 1655, 1683 n.147 (2020).
217. For more fixed-effects information, see Appendix, Part A.5 below. For an example of
another study using fixed effects, see Edwards et al., supra note 213, at 29 (describing the
use of fixed effects in a prior study).
218. See supraPart III.A.
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monthly training bulletin (March 2013);219 and (2) the date by which all
officers in the state should have completed their annual in-service training
requirement post-Arreola (December 2013).220 To the extent that Arreola is
driving the change in the number of stops of drivers of color relative to white
drivers, the results of these additional tests suggest that this effect may have
been greatest after officers had time to understand how to employ mixedmotive stops. The results of these additional tests are available in the
Appendix.2 2 1
We also disaggregated our data and ran separate regressions comparing
changes in the number of monthly traffic stops per county per month for
individual racial groups (in our case, Black drivers, Hispanic drivers, Asian
drivers, and drivers of other nonwhite races) relative to white drivers. We find
that even if we limit our analysis to individual racial subgroups, the effect
remains statistically significant. Table 3 reproduces these findings, focusing
specifically on Black and Hispanic drivers-two groups most commonly cited
as being victimized by racial profiling. 222

219. See supranote 169 and accompanying text.
220. See supranote 164 and accompanying text.
221. See infra Appendix, Part C.
222. See, e.g., Baumgartner et al., supra note 147, at 108 (specifically mentioning the
possibility of pretextual stops targeting "black and brown drivers"); Rudovsky, supra
note 14, at 301 (mentioning the targeting of African American drivers); Harris, supra
note 73 (finding possible targeting of Latino drivers).
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Table 3
Effect of Arreola on Stops of Black and Hispanic Drivers Relative to White Drivers

(2008-2015)
Difference-in-differences regressions

County-1evel fixed effects

No

No

Yes

133.953

129.026

Change in stops of
Hispanic drivers

127.7 10
(38.217)

(24.514)

(32.75)5)

Change in stops of

119.019--

108.585---

116.383--

(39.270)

(27.876)

(36.368)

Black drivers

-22.044

Mean driver age

(6.-00)

Officer race

R-squared

0.290

(2.556)

-1,110.949-

77.780

(486.933)

(124.491)

-863.607

Officer gender

--. 003~

19.992

(432.726)

(151.347)

0.328

0.538

Note: Stop data is reported per county per month. In all but the last row of this
table, the first value is the regression coefficient, while the second value (in
parentheses) is the standard error of that coefficient. The last row of this table
displays the R-squared value for each regression. N = 15,470. Asterisks indicate
degrees of significance: - p <0.1;- p <0.05; -- p <0.01.

689

An Empirical Assessment of Pretextual Stops and Racial Profiling
73 STAN. L. REV. 637 (2021)

As shown in Table 3, we find the greatest relative increase in traffic stops
among Hispanic drivers after Arreola. But we nevertheless see a statistically
significant uptick in the number of stops of Black drivers relative to white
drivers. These results also remain statistically significant after the introduction
of controls and county-level fixed effects.
We also find evidence that the treatment of nonwhite drivers after a
traffic stop, relative to white drivers, may have shifted after Arreola in a
manner consistent with the racial-profiling hypothesis. These results are
discussed in more length in Part D of the Appendix. Combined, these analyses
suggest that once police were given more discretionary authority under the
Washington pretextual-stop doctrine, they may have used this authority to
disproportionately target drivers of color for additional stops.
There is another way to test whether officers may be targeting nonwhite
drivers more after Arreola. If police responded to Arreola by targeting nonwhite
drivers for additional scrutiny, we would expect this result to be more evident
during the daytime than at night. Prior racial-profiling studies have operated
under the belief that racial profiling happens when police officers are able to
ascertain a driver's race, usually through visual observation, and then use this
observation in deciding whether to execute a traffic stop.2 23 Presumably, police
officers will be able to determine the race of a suspect more easily during the
daytime than at night. Thus, if Arreola is driving the apparent change in the
treatment of drivers of color by Washington state troopers from 2013 to 2015,
we would expect this effect to be concentrated in the daytime hours rather
than at night. The next Subpart employs this veil-of-darkness methodology 224
as a robustness check of our findings.

E.

Effects of Daylight on Traffic Stops

If the changes we observe in the number of traffic stops of nonwhite
drivers after Arreola are truly the result of increased racial profiling, we would
expect the changes to be most evident during daylight hours, when it is easiest
for a police officer to discern the race of the driver. 225 Thus, if the hypothesized
link between racial profiling and pretextual stops is present, we would expect
this apparent effect to be strongest during daylight hours and weakest during
the darkest hours of the night and morning.
To test this theory, we run triple-difference regressions. These regressions
mirror the difference-in-differences regressions from the previous Subpart but
223. See supranote 148 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 148 and accompanying text (describing prior usage of the veil-ofdarkness methodology).
225. See, e.g., Grogger & Ridgeway, supra note 135, at 878 (describing this methodology in
detail).
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add one more layer of analysis: They compare the difference-in-differences
estimates obtained from stops conducted in daylight and at night. Formally, we
estimate this regression using the following equation:
Model 3
Arreolar

+

Okg, = a + a, nonwhiteik + a2Arreolakr+ a3 darkkr+ a4 nonwhitek

asnonwhiteik ' dark.k + a6Arreolak, dark.k + a7nonwhiteik ' dark.kr Arreolakr+ AX + s
We define "daylight hours" as the time between sunrise and sunset, and we
define "dark hours" as the time between the end of nautical twilight in the
evening and the start of nautical twilight the next morning. 226 The remaining
window, which we describe as "twilight hours," covers the periods between
nautical twilight and sunrise in the morning and between sunset and the end of
nautical twilight in the evening. Since it is not clear whether an officer could
visually observe a driver's race during twilight hours, we exclude the stops
made during these hours (which make up only 7% of total stops).227
Table 4 presents our findings on the differences between stops of drivers of
color relative to white drivers during the daytime and nighttime after Arreola.
This table shows the change in the number of stops per county per month at
night (as compared to daytime) of nonwhite drivers (as compared to white
drivers). If police are engaged in racial profiling after Arreola, we would expect
to see police stopping more nonwhite drivers relative to white drivers during
the day, and we would expect this imbalance to decrease at night.

226. For the definition of nautical twilight, see Konstantin Bikos, Nautical TwilightNautical Dawn and Dusk, TIME & DATE, https://perma.cc/4K7Q-J2ZS (archived Feb. 22,
2021).
227. See generally Christian Bfinnings & Valentin Schiele, Spring Forward; Don't Fall Back:
The Effect of Daylight Saving Time on Road Safety, 103 REv. ECON. & STAT. 165 (2021)
(providing a further discussion of the various uses of twilight for social-science
research).
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Table 4
Stops of Nonwhite Drivers at Night Relative to Day Post-Arreola,

Excluding Stops Where Race Is Unidentified (2008-2015)
Triple-difference regressions

fixed effects

Post-Arreola stops of
nonwhite drivers at night
relative to day, relative to
white drivers
Mean driver age

No

NC
-45.934

-40.346=
(1 .298)

Percentage of stops by
white officers
Percentage of stops by male
officers
R-squared

Yes
-41.153`

(8.804)

(6.334)

-7.942**

-3.350**

(2.290)

(1.060)

-

County-evel

0.284

0

-416.851

42.801

(183.158)

(45.536)

-292.555

38.366

(157.382)

(41.263)

0.306

0493

Note: Stop data is reported per county per month. In all but the last row of this
table, the first value is the regression coefficient, while the second value (in
parentheses) is the standard error of that coefficient. The last row of this table
displays the R-squared value for each regression. N = 28,676. Asterisks indicate
degrees of significance:' p <0.1; " p <0.05; .. p <0.01.
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Table 4 finds evidence consistent with the hypothesis that police may be
targeting nonwhite drivers for additional scrutiny after Arreola. Police appear
particularly likely to target drivers of color during daylight hours. And at
night, the number of stops of drivers of color per county per month relative to
white drivers decreases by about forty relative to daytime. These results are
statistically significant with and without the introduction of controls and fixed
effects. They remain statistically significant when we include stops where race
is unidentified in our definition of nonwhite drivers, as seen in the
Appendix.2 28

F.

Event Study

As a final test of the effect of Arreola on officer behavior, we conduct an
event study. We use this methodology to determine whether the purported
change in officer behavior towards nonwhite drivers can be fairly attributed to
the Arreola decision from December 2012 (and the subsequent training that
occurred in 2013) rather than other contemporaneous events. 229 Essentially,
this methodology calculates the difference in traffic-stop patterns between
white and nonwhite drivers over time. The lines that extend above and below
each data point represent confidence intervals. If the entirety of this line is
above or below zero, then we can say at some level of confidence that the
differential between trends in white and nonwhite traffic stops is statistically
significant. By contrast, if this confidence interval extends both above and
below zero, then we cannot say that the results are statistically significant. Put
differently, if Arreola is driving any subsequent changes in stops of nonwhite
drivers relative to white drivers, we would expect the differentials to become
statistically significant only after the court issued its opinion in Arreola in
December 2012 and officers received training in this new technique in 2013.
Figure 8 presents the results of this analysis. 230

228. As is sometimes customary with triple-difference regressions, we report in the
Appendix the results of the "placebo" difference-in-differences regressions (that is,
comparing stops for just white drivers during the day and at night). However, we urge
caution in reading too much into these results for reasons outlined more fully in the
Appendix, Parts A.4 and B.

&

229. The use of this methodology for this purpose is consistent with prior studies. See
generally Melissa S. Kearney & Phillip B. Levine, Media Influences on Social Outcomes: The
Impact of MTV's 16 and Pregnant on Teen Childbearing, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 3597 (2015)
(using this approach to attribute changes in teen pregnancy to an MTV television
show on teenage pregnancy); Griffin Edwards, Erik Nesson, Joshua J. Robinson
Frederick Vars, Looking Down the Barrel of a Loaded Gun: The Effect of Mandatory
Handgun Purchase Delays on Homicide and Suicide, 128 ECON.J. 3117, 3134-35 (2018) (using
such an event study in a methodologically similar way).
230. The year 2012 acts as our comparison in the event study since it was the last full year
without treatment. In these event-study-style regressions, we necessarily must use one
footnote continued on next page
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Figure 8
Event Study of Differentials in Stops of White Drivers and Nonwhite Drivers,

Excluding Stops Where Race Is Unidentified (2009-2015)
Differentials
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year as a baseline for comparison. Because we estimate no effect in 2012 it has no
confidence bounds. We signify that in Figure 8 with the dot at zero.
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In the year leading up Arreola, the differentials in the trends of white and
nonwhite traffic stops are statistically insignificant. These differentials only
become statistically significant after the Arreola decision. This is true regardless
of whether we include stops where race is unidentified in our analysis. 23 1
G.

Methodological Limitations

While we believe that our results provide evidence consistent with the
hypothesis that Arreola resulted in a disproportionate number of stops of
drivers of color, it is important to recognize the limitations of our dataset and
methodology. First, this study focuses specifically on the Washington State
Patrol and does not cover all law-enforcement behavior in Washington. The
Washington State Patrol has a somewhat different set of law-enforcement
priorities than many municipal police and sheriffs' departments.2 32 These
differences in responsibilities may call into question whether our findings are
generalizable to other law-enforcement agencies in Washington or the rest of
the United States. Despite this potential limitation, we still believe that the
Washington State Patrol is a particularly useful agency in which to study the
effects of judicial regulation of traffic-code enforcement because of the
enormous volume of traffic stops the agency conducts across the state. 233 But
we acknowledge that any differences in job responsibilities between state
troopers and municipal police officers or sheriff's deputies could limit the
generalizability of our findings.
Second, our analysis is limited to a single law-enforcement agency. This
limitation was unavoidable. The Washington State Patrol is the only lawenforcement agency that appears to have kept this kind of extensive trafficstop data in any of the two states (New Mexico and Washington) that

231. See infra Appendix, Figure A.1.
232. See About Us, supra note 22. For a detailed description of the law-enforcement priorities
of this agency, see Crime, WASH. ST. PATROL, https://perma.cc/L5YN-JX7W (archived
Jan. 8, 2021) (describing the agency's responsibility for "[v]essel and terminal safety,"
certain investigation services, investigations of missing children and most wanted
criminals, and criminal and collision records). These responsibilities may be compared
to local law-enforcement agencies, which unlike their state counterparts, may be
focused more on local policing issues. See, e.g., About Us: About Policing, CITY OF SEATTLE,
https://perma.cc/B4W2-7SWC (archived Feb. 22, 2021) (describing the mission and
jurisdiction of the Seattle Police Department, including parking enforcement, SWAT,
the management of a 9-1-1 center, and a canine unit); Crime Prevention and Safety, CITY
OF VANCOUVER, WASH., https://perma.cc/WYB5-BCY9 (archived Feb. 22, 2021)
(describing the crime prevention efforts of the police department in Vancouver,
Washington, including responding to graffiti, construction-site-theft prevention,
home safety, and internet safety).
233. See supranotes 21-22 and accompanying text.
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experimented with different rules for pretextual stops.234 Seattle and Tacoma
have kept data on traffic stops since 2005 and 2007, respectively. 235 But neither
jurisdiction has provided the Stanford Open Policing Project with data on the
race of drivers stopped by police officers. 236 And as far as we can tell, no
jurisdiction in New Mexico keeps consistent, publicly available data on traffic
stops sufficient for this type of rigorous analysis.2 37 The depth and
extensiveness of the Washington State Patrol dataset, though, helps alleviate
some of the concerns about our focus on a single jurisdiction.
Third, our model cannot control for other political forces at work around
the time of the Arreola decision. As mentioned previously, the legalization of
marijuana occurred almost simultaneously to Arreola.238 Legalization poses a
threat to our empirical strategy if there is reason to believe that police officers
changed their behavior in response to legalized marijuana differently across
racial groups. It seems likely that marijuana legalization changed lawenforcement behavior in some way. Provided their behavior changed the same
across races, our results remain valid. To be more specific, as long as the
resulting change in police behavior affected racial groups equally, then it
would not result in any changes in our difference-in-differences or tripledifference models. Based on visual inspection of the trends in stop patterns by
racial group as seen in Figure 2 and the formal analysis of pretrends in
Figure 8,239 we fail to find any evidence to suggest disproportionate responses
by race in the months and years leading up to marijuana legalization. That is,
we suspect that most law-enforcement agencies in Washington knew that
recreational marijuana may become legalized. The downward trend in stops
and searches of vehicles prior to the legalization date may reflect the
anticipated legalization. 240
234. See supranote 78 and accompanying text.
235. Data, supranote 171.
236. Id. (showing no data on driver race for these jurisdictions).
237. Id. (showing in the list of available datasets that no jurisdiction in New Mexico has
provided data to the Project).
238. See supranotes 205-06 and accompanying text.
239. Simon Freyaldenhoven, Christian Hansen & Jesse M. Shapiro, Pre-event Trends in the
Panel Event Study Design, 109 AM. ECON. REv. 3307, 3307 (2019) (explaining that "[a]
common diagnostic approach in such settings is to look at whether the policy change
appears to have an effect on the outcome before it actually occurs" and that "[t]he
presence of such pre-event trends or 'pre-trends,' is taken as evidence against the strict
exogeneity of the policy change").
240. Note again in Figure 3 how closely the pretrends in white and nonwhite stop counts
track one another. If there were reason to believe that officers, say, decreased the rate at
which they stopped white drivers, but not nonwhite drivers, due to marijuana, that
should be apparent in the buildup to the new law when officers began to anticipate the
change. We see no such divergence in trends.
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Additionally, important political changes occurred around the same time
as Arreola. Washington voters elected a new governor 241 and attorney
general, 242 and Republicans took control of the state senate. 243 Any of these
changes may suggest political endogeneity-meaning that any underlying
change in politics (rather than Arreola) could be driving our results. While we
cannot discount this possibility, we believe that the evidence is still mostly
consistent with the hypothesis that permissive pretextual-stop doctrines may
contribute to more stops of drivers of color, particularly since it appears that
the effect of Arreola may strengthen over time-a trend that may correspond
with the gradually increasing dissemination of the new rule through training.
Nevertheless, we cannot discount the possibility that other factors are also
contributing to the changes in police behavior.
Finally, as with any empirical study of this type, readers should view our
study for what it is: "one data point in what will hopefully be a growing
literature" on the effect of pretextual-stop doctrines on police behavior. 244 An
ideal study of the effect of cases like Whren and Arreola on officer behavior
would employ complete datasets from a wide range of jurisdictions that keep
data in a sufficiently similar manner (so as to allow for cross-jurisdictional
comparisons). Unfortunately, such data is not yet available. Thus, our results
will likely need to be replicated, hopefully in new locations as more
jurisdictional variation emerges among states and municipalities.
IV. Implications for the Law of Policing
Our findings have important implications for the law of policing. First,
and primarily, our results are consistent with the predictions made by many
scholars after Whren. 245 The data from Washington suggest that legal rules
giving police officers increased discretion to conduct pretextual or mixedmotive traffic stops may contribute to inequality by facilitating racial
profiling. More generally, our analysis suggests that rules granting police
discretion in traffic stops may lead to more traffic stops of drivers of color,
with some likely escalating to more serious encounters. Second, our findings
241. Jim Brunner, McKenna Concedes; Inslee to Be Governor, SEATTLE
2012, 1:08 PM), https://perma.cc/36VL-KZTP.

TIMES

(updated Nov. 10,

242. Washington's Attorneys General-Past and Present, WASH. ST. OFF. ATT'Y GEN.,
https://perma.cc/59GV-DKM6 (archived Jan. 8, 2021) (showing that Bob Ferguson was
elected as Attorney General in November 2012 and took office in 2013).
243. Party Control of Washington State Government, BALLOTPEDIA, https://perma.cc/T89SVM23 (archived Jan. 8, 2021) (showing that Republicans took control of the state
senate in 2013 and held power until 2017).
244. Rushin & Edwards, De-Policing, supra note 213, at 772.
245. See supra Part I.B.
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are particularly troubling given that the victims of racial profiling during
traffic stops often have limited means of seeking redress for the harms they
suffer. With these negative consequences in mind, our results may bolster two
emerging reform proposals: (1) the idea that traffic-code enforcement should be
decoupled from the investigation of more serious criminal offenses; and (2) the
notion that we should remove discretion in traffic enforcement through the
integration of technological enforcement tools.
A.

Harmful Consequences of Whren

As discussed in Part II above, a large and growing body of literature has
found suspicious patterns in traffic-stop data in communities around the
United States.2 46 These studies suggest that police in a significant number of
jurisdictions may consider a driver's race-either consciously or
subconsciously-in executing traffic stops. 247 What has remained somewhat
less clear, though, is the extent to which deferential judicial decisions like
Whren contribute to this pattern of apparent racial profiling. Why are police
officers in jurisdictions across the country enforcing traffic laws more harshly
against minority drivers than white drivers? Is it because of explicit racial bias?
Implicit bias? A lack of existing controls? Or perhaps some combination of all
of these factors? Our data helps resolve that controversy. It provides evidence
that decisions endorsing pretextual traffic stops may be one contributor to
racial profiling by police officers. If Arreola, with its somewhat narrower
holding than Whren, has potentially contributed to an increase in stops and
searches of drivers of color relative to white drivers across Washington, it
stands to reason that Whren may have similarly facilitated racial profiling. By
giving police officers a license to act on their hunches or suspicions via
pretextual or mixed-motive stops, both Whren and Arreola may lead to more
officers treating drivers of color differently because of implicit-or explicitbias.
This finding may, in turn, guide policymakers looking to prevent racial
profiling. Our data suggests that police-reform advocates concerned about
racial bias in policing should consider lobbying for legislative enactments that
provide additional protections against pretextual stops. With Whren decided a
little over two decades ago, it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court will
reconsider its holding anytime soon. But this does not prevent states from
using their legislative powers to enact limitations on police authority to
conduct pretextual stops.

246. See supra notes 120-48 and accompanying text (describing a wide variety of studies
demonstrating apparent patterns of racial bias in jurisdictions across the country).
247. See supranotes 120-48 and accompanying text.
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If moving from Ladson to Arreola contributed to a statistically significant
increase in apparent racial profiling by Washington state troopers, this would
suggest that the Ladson decision did exert at least some influence on police
behavior.2 48 It may have suppressed some stops of drivers of color and may
have reduced the willingness of police to engage in racial profiling. This
realization is important, as it suggests that Whren's holding was not merely
symbolic. Had the Court ruled differently-for example, by developing a rule
similar to that introduced by Washington in the Ladson case-it conceivably
could have influenced police behavior in a way that reduced racial bias by
officers. Such a change could have had major implications for the lives of
millions of Americans. As Charles R. Epp, Steven Maynard-Moody, and
Donald Haider-Markel have previously argued, traffic stops by police "matter"
because "[n]o form of direct government control comes close to these stops in
sheer numbers, frequency, proportion of the population affected, and, in many
instances, the degree of coercive intrusion."249 Police conduct an estimated 18
million traffic stops every year. 25 0 These stops "convey powerful messages
about citizenship and equality."25 1 Thus, states could theoretically use the
Ladson holding as one model for enacting stricter regulations of pretextual
stops. And based on Washington's experience, it seems possible that stricter
regulation of pretextual stops could have widespread implications for the
relationship between police and communities of color across the country.
Relatedly, our findings may have important implications for the study of
police violence. In the years since the protests in Ferguson, Missouri, in 2014,
media outlets and civil rights groups have attempted to document the
frequency of civilian deaths at the hands of American law-enforcement
officials.25 2 Databases like those maintained by the Washington Post,25 3 the

248. See supraParts III.D-.F.
249. EPP ET AL., supranote 15, at 2.
250. Id.
251. Id.; see also Joe Soss & Vesla Weaver, Police Are Our Government: Politics, PoliticalScience,
and the Policing of Race-Class Subjugated Communities, 20 ANN. R. PoL. Sc. 565, 567, 569
(2017) (discussing the "social control" face of American government and its impact on
communities of color).
252. Jamiles Lartey, US Police Killings Undercounted by Half, Study Using GuardianData Finds,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 11, 2017, 7:00 AM EDT), https://perma.cc/H9CQ-DCLH (discussing a
study on the number of individuals killed by police and noting that these kinds of
projects were "intended to help remedy the lack of reliable data on police killings, a
lack that became especially visible after the 2014 unrest in Ferguson").
253. Fatal Force, WASH. POST, https://perma.cc/L3UV-9WWH (last updated Feb. 4, 2021)
(providing estimates for the number of individuals shot and killed by police from 2015
through 2021).
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Guardian,25 4 Fatal Encounters,255 and Mapping Police Violence256 have attempted
to document not just the number of killings by police, but also the
circumstances that contribute to these deaths. One topic, though, has received
somewhat less attention in the growing literature on police violence: how
traffic stops serve as the starting point for many violent interactions between
police and civilians, including those interactions that ultimately result in
officers utilizing deadly force. No existing database provides an easy way to
search for police killings that happened after police officers executed a traffic
stop. Nevertheless, a quick analysis of the Guardiandatabase from 2016 suggests
that a substantial number of such incidents began with traffic stops. 25 7 For
example, approximately 8% or 9% of all police killings in November and
December 2016 happened subsequent to a police traffic stop. 25 8 Thus, it seems
possible that by contributing to more routine traffic stops of drivers of color,
pretextual-stop doctrines may expose these individuals to a greater likelihood
of coercive behavior and ultimately police violence.
B.

Lack of Options for Redress

Our findings are also concerning because victims of racial profiling during
traffic stops currently have few options for redress. In Whren, the Court
emphasized that targeting a driver for a traffic stop because of their race
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.25 9 But as a practical
matter, it remains difficult for a victim of such racial profiling to obtain relief.
Pretextual stops based on a driver's race may not result in the discovery of
contraband. If police uncover no evidence of criminal wrongdoing, then one of

254. The Counted: People Killed by Police in the US, GUARDIAN, https://perma.cc/URF8-2KPE
(archived Jan. 8, 2021) (providing detailed estimates of the number of individuals killed
by police in 2015 and 2016 in the United States). The Guardianfirst made the data
available in June 2015, but it was updated regularly thereafter to reflect updated
estimates of police killing for both 2015 and 2016. Id.
255. FATAL ENCOUNTERS, https://perma.cc/C9C6-GR2E (archived Jan. 8, 2021) (providing
an extensive database on police killings in the United States over many years, and
serving as a major source for other similar databases).
256. MAPPING POLICE VIOLENCE, https://perma.cc/Q3KL-TQR5 (archived Jan. 8, 2021)
(collecting and categorizing an extensive amount of data on the number of individuals
killed by law enforcement over the years, with a particular focus on the ways that this
violence disproportionately affects Black individuals).
257. The Counted: People Killed by Police in the US, supra note 254 (to locate, navigate to data
for 2016).
258. See id. We calculated these figures by manually evaluating whether each killing in the
Guardian's database appeared to be connected with a routine traffic stop, given the
descriptions of the circumstances surrounding the killing provided by the website.
259. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
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the most important deterrents to police misconduct-the exclusionary rule-is
of little practical use. 260
Additionally, the compensable damage that an individual suffers from a
single unlawful traffic stop is often minimal, making it highly unlikely that
potential plaintiffs will take advantage of their right to seek civil damages
against police officers who violate their constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.261 If a victim of racial profiling hopes to use § 1983 to secure injunctive
relief rather than civil damages, the Court's holding in City of Los Angeles v.
Lyons makes it difficult for the victim to establish standing in federal court
because of their inability to demonstrate a likelihood of future harm. 262 And, of
course, it can be particularly difficult to prove in a civil court or in an internal
disciplinary hearing that a police officer was motivated by a driver's race,
creating significant evidentiary issues. 263 Thus, as previous scholars have
persuasively argued, 264 it is extremely challenging for victims of racial
profiling in traffic enforcement to receive relief under the current police
regulatory system.265 This realization, alongside our findings of racial
260. See Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through ProactivePolicing Reform, 62 STAN.
L. REv. 1, 10-11 (2009) (explaining that "the scope of the exclusionary rule is inevitably
much narrower than the scope of illegal police misconduct," and further explaining
that "[m]any kinds of misconduct" by police do not result in the collection of evidence
that may be used or excluded from a later criminal proceeding).
261. See id. at 9-10 (discussing how "inexpensive settlement[s]" resulting from § 1983 suits
may reduce the incentive for departmental reform); Jason Mazzone & Stephen Rushin,
From Selma to Ferguson: The Voting Rights Act as a Blueprintfor Police Reform, 105 CALIF.
L. REv. 263, 276 (2017) ("The absence of punitive damages-a remedy designed to deter
unlawful behavior-means any resulting judgment (or threat thereof) may be
insufficient to alter police practices, even assuming available compensatory damages
are sufficient to prompt victims to bring lawsuits in the first place. In essence, in many
instances it is not worth the trouble even to initiate the suit." (footnote omitted)).
262. 461 U.S. 95, 105-06, 109 (1983) (holding that in order to have standing to pursue
injunctive relief against the Los Angeles Police Department to ban the use of a
chokehold that caused him harm, Mr. Lyons needed to prove a substantial likelihood of
future harm-something he couldn't do in this case, because he was unlikely to be
victimized by the same chokehold procedure again in the future).
263. Intuitively, this difficulty stems from the fact that police will often hide their actual
discriminatory intent behind seemingly race-neutral explanations. For an example, see
the discussion of this problem in the Floyd case. Supra notes 137-39 and accompanying
text.
264. See supranotes 65-72 and accompanying text.
265. To be clear, our evidence alone will not make it any easier for a litigant to succeed in
these cases. At best, our data merely provide evidence of the disparate impact of police
behavior on communities of color, which we believe the Washington Supreme Court
facilitated in its holding in Arreola. We think this data alone should be sufficient to
worry lawmakers and potentially inspire policy change to limit the scope of police
authority in making traffic stops. Nevertheless, we cannot prove the intentional racial
discrimination on the part of Washington police that would be required to satisfy the
standard articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Washington v. Davis for claims under
footnote continued on next page
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inequality pervading pretextual traffic stops, may reinforce the need for states
and localities to enact regulations that go beyond those articulated in Whren.
Additionally, given the lack of available options for aggrieved individuals to
seek redress, other actors within the criminal-justice system may consider
using their authority to discourage law-enforcement use of pretextual traffic
stops. For example, San Francisco District Attorney Chesa Boudin announced
in February 2020 that his office intended to end the charging of criminal cases
involving contraband obtained during pretextual stops. 266
C.

Decoupling Criminal Investigations and Traffic Enforcement

Finally, our results may support emerging scholarly calls for the
decoupling of criminal investigations and traffic enforcement. 267 The
pretextual stops that occurred in major cases like Whren and Ladson happened
when police officers tasked with the enforcement of more serious criminal
offenses used a technical traffic violation to justify the investigation of a hunch
or suspicion. For example, in Ladson, Officers Mack and Ziesmer were not
actually concerned about whether the driver had an expired registration
sticker.268 As members of a local gang-patrol unit, they suspected that the
driver was trafficking drugs.2 69 Similarly, in Whren, the officers were
patrolling an area known for drug trafficking, seemingly in anticipation of
uncovering evidence of drug crimes. 270 In each case, the officers were able to
the Equal Protection Clause, which can serve as the basis for § 1983 claims. 426 U.S. 229,
239 (1976); see also Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
267-68 (1977) (establishing factors that courts can consider in evaluating whether
sufficient evidence exists to prove an Equal Protection Clause violation). Thus, Whren,
Arreola, and other comparable opinions may contribute to widespread racial profiling
that cannot be easily addressed by police accountability mechanisms.
266. See Evan Sernoffsky, DA Chesa Boudin Sets New Policies on SF Police Stops, Gang
Enhancements, Three Strikes, S.F. CHRON. (updated Feb. 28, 2020, 4:00 AM),
https://perma.cc/W76M-5K5M.
267. See, e.g., Jordan Blair Woods, Decriminalization, Police Authority, and Routine Traffic Stops,
62 UCLA L. REV. 672, 751, 756-59 (2015) [hereinafter Woods, Decriminalization]
(offering as one possible reform the removal of police officers from the enforcement of
traffic laws, particularly decriminalized traffic offenses, and transferring that
authority to state actors without traditional police powers); Jordan Blair Woods,
Traffic Without the Police, 73 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming May 2021) (manuscript at 4),
https://perma.cc/3ZEN-V3K7 (arguing for the removal of police officers from certain
traffic-enforcement responsibilities).
268. State v. Ladson, 979 P.2d 833, 836 (Wash. 1999) (en banc) ("The officers do not deny the
stop was pretextual.").
269. Id. ("The officers explained they do not make routine traffic stops while on proactive
gang patrol although they use traffic infractions as a means to pull over people in order
to initiate contact and questioning.").
270. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 808 (1996) (describing the area under patrol as
a "highdrug area").
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conduct a pretextual stop because the law empowered them both to make traffic
stops and to make arrests for other criminal offenses. Some non-U.S.
jurisdictions have experimented with decriminalizing some traffic offenses
and transferring traffic enforcement to units whose only responsibility is to
enforce the traffic code, not to investigate and respond to criminal acts more
broadly.2 71 This kind of decoupling of traffic enforcement from other police
work may result in more evenhanded enforcement, and it would presumably
eliminate the use of traffic enforcement as a pretext for other criminal
investigations. At least one American city-Berkeley, California-has already
taken steps to remove traffic enforcement from the purview of its local police
department.272
Opponents of such a proposal may understandably argue that enforcement
of traffic laws exposes non-law-enforcement officers to unreasonable risks of
physical harm. Policing, they may argue, is a dangerous job, even if an officer is
primarily engaged in traffic stops. But compelling new evidence suggests that
many may overestimate the risk of injuries to police officers engaged in
routine traffic enforcement. Analyzing over 200 law-enforcement agencies in
Florida over a ten-year period, Jordan Blair Woods found that the risk of
violence in traffic enforcement was extremely low. 273 Roughly one in every
6.5 million routine traffic stops results in the felonious killing of an officer, and
one in every 361,111 stops results in an assault causing serious injury.274 This
finding suggests, at a minimum, that traffic enforcement may not be so
dangerous as to necessitate the involvement of traditional police personnel. 275
Alternatively, our findings may strengthen arguments for reducing police
discretion in traffic enforcement through the integration of emerging
technology. Elizabeth Joh has persuasively argued that traffic-enforcement

271. See Woods, Decriminalization, supra note 267, at 756 (citing New Zealand as an example
of a jurisdiction that experimented with such an approach between 1936 and 1992).
272. Rachel Sandler, Berkeley Will Become 1st U.S. City to Remove Police from Traffic Stops,
FORBES (updatedJuly 15, 2020, 8:22 PM EDT), https://perma.cc/Y8AQ-BJ2U.
273. Jordan Blair Woods, Policing, Danger Narratives, and Routine Traffic Stops, 117 MIcH. L.
REV. 635, 640, 660-62, 668 (2019).
274. Id. at 640, 683.
275. While reassigning traffic-enforcement responsibilities might limit the ability of lawenforcement officers to use traffic stops as a crime-fighting tool, and would potentially
come at a significant financial cost, it would all but eliminate the current incentive for
police officers to use traffic enforcement as a pretext for broader criminal
investigations. Steven Maynard-Moody & Michael Musheno, Social Equities and
Inequities in Practice: Street-Level Workers as Agents and Pragmatists, 72 PUB. ADMIN. REV.
S16, S21 (2012) ("[O]ne of the primary and most institutionalized 'crime-fighting' tools
of modern proactive policing is the investigatory stop of drivers and pedestrians.").
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technologies could eliminate the need for most discretionary traffic stops. 276
discretion
made challenges
to
police
Whren,
she argued,
has
"[i]mpracticable." 277 Instead, a number of technologies could, in effect, partially
supplant ordinary, discretionary traffic enforcement by police officers: redlight cameras, 278 speed cameras, 279 and automatic license-plate readers 280 As
Joh explains, such automated enforcement technologies could more fairly and
consistently perform moving-violation enforcement, criminal-record checks,
vehicle-defects checks, and drunk-driving enforcement.2 8 1 And Joh has argued
that automated enforcement could avoid police interactions that are
"humiliating or discriminatory." 282 Obviously, these traffic-enforcement
technologies may still create significant risks of inequality in how they are
developed, in the algorithms they employ, in the data they create, and in where
they are utilized.283 Andrew Guthrie Ferguson has written extensively on the
risks associated with these types of advanced policing technologies. 284 To be

276. Elizabeth E. Joh, DiscretionlessPolicing: Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 95 CALIF.
L. REV. 199, 216-25 (2007).
277. Id. at 212-13.
278. See, e.g., Richard A. Retting, Susan A. Ferguson & A. Shalom Hakkert, Effects of Red Light
Cameras on Violations and Crashes: A Review of the InternationalLiterature, 4 TRAFFIC INJ.
PREVENTION 17, 19, 22 (2003) (finding that red-light-camera enforcement results in a
possible decrease in violations and a possible decrease in injury crashes, although
injury-crash estimates vary from one study to the next).
279. See, e.g., Richard Tay, Speed Cameras: Improving Safety or Raising Revenue?, 44 J. TRANSP.
ECON. & POL'Y 247, 248-49 (2010) (finding that the installation of speed cameras in
Edmonton, Alberta, resulted in reductions in injury crashes, and suggesting that
cameras may have been a deterrent to unlawful speeding).
280. See, e.g., Jason Potts, Research in Brief Assessing the Effectiveness of Automatic License Plate
Readers, POLICE CHIEF, Mar. 2018, at 14, 14, https://perma.cc/EZT3-4V98 (describing a
study showing that automatic license-plate readers can increase the ability of police to
detect stolen cars).
281. See id. at 222 tbl.l (listing these common reasons for police exercising their discretion to
make traffic stops and finding that they would be candidates for automated
enforcement).
282. Id. at 224.
283. See ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING: SURVEILLANCE, RACE,
AND THE FUTURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 3, 5 (2017) (explaining how data-driven

policing disproportionately targets and affects marginalized communities).
284. For a broader discussion of the many risks posed by emerging police technologies, see
generally id. A number of other commentators have also written detailed accounts of
the potential for abuse of these emerging police technologies. See, e.g., Bryce Clayton
Newell, Local Law Enforcement Jumps on the Big DataBandwagon: Automated License Plate
Recognition Systems, Information Privacy, and Access to Government Information, 66 ME. L.
REV. 397, 399-400 (2014) (exploring legal and policy divides surrounding, and some of
the potential drawbacks of, automated license-plate readers); Joh, supra note 276, at
226-33 (describing various objections to automated enforcement of traffic laws via
technological tools). The Policing Project has also done extensive research on the need
footnote continued on next page
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clear, our study alone does not support a wholesale move from human to
technological enforcement of traffic codes. Nevertheless, our data is consistent
with the hypothesis that police may abuse the discretion given to them by
Whren and similar state cases. To the extent that technological enforcement of
traffic codes may limit opportunities to exercise such discretion, it is possible
that a careful and well-regulated technological-enforcement regime could
produce more equitable outcomes.
Conclusion
For decades, scholars have worried that Whren would invite racial
profiling in routine traffic enforcement. This hypothesis seemed both intuitive
and consistent with the large body of literature on the ways that race affects
police decisionmaking. 285 Nevertheless, the existing body of research has been
unable to evaluate this hypothesis empirically. Our study provides strong
support for this hypothesis. The judicial authorization of mixed-motive stops
in Washington-which closely resemble the kind of pretextual stops at issue in
the Whren decision-was associated with a statistically significant increase in
stops and searches of drivers of color relative to white drivers in the state.
Most of this increase occurred during daylight hours, when police could most
readily determine the race of drivers. These findings are consistent with
scholarly claims that Whren and state court equivalents "permit racial bias,
either explicit or implicit, to go unchecked and unpunished." 286 Ultimately,
these findings should serve as a sobering reminder that legal rules granting
police discretion, even if they make "sense ... from the point of view of judicial
administration," 287 may come at the cost of inequality in our justice system.

to balance privacy concerns against the potential benefits of these technological tools.
See Surveillance Technology, POLICING PROJECT: N.Y.U. SCH. L., https://perma.cc/6G6JBSFM (archived Jan. 8, 2021) (providing numerous resources on these types of
technologies).
285. See, e.g., L. Song Richardson, Implicit Racial Bias and Racial Anxiety: Implicationsfor Stops
and Frisks, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 73, 75-81 (2017) (discussing the existing body of
literature showing that implicit bias and racial anxiety affect police behaviors and
perceptions of potential suspects).
286. Simmons, supranote 59, at 29.
287. Harris, supranote 4, at 545.
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Appendix
In this Appendix, we explain in more detail many of our methodological
choices. We also provide additional details on versions of our models.

A. Modeling Choices
In an empirical undertaking, there are a host of modeling decisions that
need be made. In this Part, we lay out the decisions we made and the
justifications for them.
1.

Reliance on the number of traffic stops by race by county

Our main analysis aggregates the number of traffic stops per month per
county. Aggregating data, though, comes at some empirical costs. For instance,
if we were looking at homicides in the United States, and we aggregated the
count of homicides by state, an additional five homicides reported in a large
state like California or Texas would be less significant than an increase of five
homicides in a less populous state like Wyoming. One possible empirical
approach is to calculate per capita rates by dividing the outcome by the
population and then taking the natural logarithm of that rate. The natural-log
transformation is a convenient way to help smooth the data without biasing
the outcome variable, and it allows the coefficients to be interpreted as semielasticities or percent changes. For reasons laid out previously-namely, the
lack of any reliable measure of the underlying population or demographics of
those on the specific roads policed by the Washington State Patrol 288 -we
chose to leave the data in count form, meaning that each observation is the
count of stops per county per month per racial group. While there still might
be some smoothing benefits associated with taking the natural log of the count
data, doing so would come at the cost of addressing the occurrence of zero
outcomes in the dataset (that is, county-month pairs with zero stops for a
particular racial group). Mathematically, we cannot take the natural log of a
zero, meaning that we would have to deploy a different transformation. While
there are alternative transformations, such as the inverse hyperbolic sine
transformation, or alternative regression strategies, such as fixed-effects
Poisson regressions, we opt for ordinary-least-squares regressions as they are
computationally more feasible, rely on fewer modeling assumptions, and
289
produce largely similar results.

288. See supra Part III.B.
289. See Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, Multiplicative Panel Data Models Without the Strict Exogeneity
Assumption, 13 ECONOMETRIC THEORY 667, 669-72 (1997) (discussing the assumptions
involved in Poisson regressions).
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2.

Calculating and clustering of standard errors

Accurately calculating the standard errors of an estimated coefficient is
critical to valid statistical inference. As Marianne Bertrand, Esther Duflo, and
Sendhil Mullainathan have argued, difference-in-differences estimates may
report systematically biased standard errors. To correct this inaccuracy, they
proposed a standard-error-clustering technique to adjust for this sort of bias
based on the group level where serial correlation occurs, which usually is
within the group.2 90 Further expansion of this strand of research has provided
theoretical justification for multiway clustering in situations where serial
correlation in the error terms might exist across multiple groupings-in our
case, county and year.2 9 1 Given this context, we cluster the standard errors of
all our results by county and by year (though the results are insensitive to
virtually any plausible level and combination of clustering we could imagine).
We ultimately settled on two-way clustering by county and year because it
consistently provided the most conservative estimates.
3.

Parallel-trends assumption

Unbiased difference-in-differences estimations require the existence of
parallel pretrends. Essentially, we want to ensure that both our groups (here,
stops of white and nonwhite drivers) were trending in a similar direction prior
to the event in question. Otherwise, any divergence in trends after Arreola may
simply be a continuation of this underlying difference in existing trends.
Researchers typically operationalize the parallel-trends assumption in several
ways. The first is a simple visual inspection of the trends in question. That is,
the two lines should move roughly together prior to the new law's passage. As
stated previously, visual inspection of Figures 1 and 2 suggest that traffic stops
of white and nonwhite drivers were generally trending together in a
predictably cyclical fashion prior to Arreola.
Second, we present a formal test of the parallel-trends assumption, which
we report in Figure 8 as part of the event study, 292 by creating dummy
290. See generally Marianne Bertrand, Esther Duflo & Sendhil Mullainathan, How Much
Should We Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates?, 119 Q.J. ECON. 249, 254-58, 273
(2004) (proposing such an approach).
291. See generally A. Colin Cameron, Jonah B. Gelbach & Douglas L. Miller, Robust Inference
with Multiway Clustering, 29 J. Bus. & ECON. STAT. 238, 238-39 (2011) (discussing
inferences with multiway clustering).
292. In the event study reported in Table A.1, we chose to group the pretrends dummy
variables by year. Grouping them by month or quarter might possibly give a more
detailed picture of the nuances in pretrends, but doing so comes at the cost of
diminished statistical power and extremely noisy results. We opted for the less
granular, but also less noisy, grouping by year since it appears to best strike the balance
between precision and noise.
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variables that capture the time periods prior to the legal change interacted
with the racial group in question. As we report, we find no evidence to suggest
that trends in traffic stops of white and nonwhite drivers diverged in a
statistically significant way prior to Arreola. Divergence of these trends appears
to occur after Arreola.
4.

Use of triple-difference regressions and a placebo test

In Part III.E, we employed a veil-of-darkness methodology to examine
changes in the number of stops of nonwhite drivers relative to white drivers at
night relative to daytime after Arreola. In Table 4, we found that after Arreola,
officers stopped more nonwhite drivers relative to white drivers in the
daytime relative to nighttime. This result holds regardless of whether we
include or exclude stops where race is unidentified in our definition of
nonwhite, as discussed in Part B of the Appendix below. To further validate
this finding, we present in Table A.1 the results of a placebo test. It is common
in triple-difference regressions to report the results of this sort of a placebo test
as evidence that we used an acceptable control not otherwise influenced by the
policy change in question. 293 If we used an acceptable control, we would expect
to see no statistically significant effect of the policy change on our control
group. In this placebo test, we run a similar model to that displayed in Table 4,
except this time we focus exclusively on changes in the number of stops of
exclusively white drivers in the daytime relative to the nighttime hours before
and after Arreola.

293. For examples of the context in which this sort of presentation makes sense, see
generally Nicolai Brachowicz & Judit Vall Castello, Is Changing the Minimum Legal
Drinking Age an Effective Policy Tool?, 28 HEALTH ECON. 1483, 1486 & tbl.1, 1487 (2019)
(showing a null result for a falsification test in Table 1 as a check on the robustness of
their findings); Gruber, supra note 24, at 632 & tbl.3 (relying on a similar approach in
the presentation of data in Table 3).
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Table A.1
Placebo Test for Veil-of-Darkness Methodology,

White Drivers Only (2008-2015)
Triple-difference regressions
County-1evel fixed effects

No

Change in stops of white

38.229

24.656"

drivers

(19.771)

(9.036)

(22.384)

-76.101 **

-5.231

(21.474)

(5.882)

-1,889.853

-108.568

(977.854)

(192.929)

No

Mean driver age

Officer race

Officer gender

R-squared

0.05`

Yes

36.810

-1,487.960

130.418

(877.977)

(120.438)

0.236

0.806

Note: Stop data is reported per county per month. In all but the last row of this
table, the first value is the regression coefficient, while the second value (in
parentheses) is the standard error of that coefficient. The last row of this table
displays the R-squared value for each regression. N = 6,546. Asterisks indicate
degrees of significance:' p <0.1; " p <0.05; .. p <0.01.
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As seen in Table A.1 above, when we add in fixed effects and controls, we
fail to find evidence that Arreola contributed to a statistically significant change
in the frequency of stops of white drivers at night relative to the daytime.
More generally, we believe that the nature of our model and our
underlying research question may increase the validity of our findings. Some
have criticized prior studies employing veil-of-darkness methodologies
because they are not clean experiments. 294 In a typical study employing a veilof-darkness methodology, researchers sometimes conduct a difference-indifferences regression that compares the change in the number of stops of
white drivers at night versus day with the change in the number of stops of
nonwhite drivers at night versus day. But this sort of model cannot account for
differences in driving behavior at certain times of the day that may correlate
with race in some manner. And while it may be harder for a police officer to
determine a driver's race at night, it is not always impossible.
An example may better illustrate this concern. Imagine a researcher is
trying to determine whether the hypothetical Pleasantville Police Department
is engaged in racial profiling by conducting a veil-of-darkness test.
Pleasantville's population is almost entirely white. But Pleasantville has an
automobile-manufacturing plant that operates twenty-four hours per day.
During the daytime, this plant employs mostly Black and Hispanic workers.
But at night, this plant employs mostly white employees. This may complicate
the ability of a researcher to use a veil-of-darkness methodology to prove that
the Pleasantville Police Department is engaged in racial profiling. Any increase
in the number of stops of Black and Hispanic drivers during the daytime may
be the result of an increased number of Black and Hispanic drivers on the road
violating traffic laws as they commute to and from the automobile plant,
rather than any sort of profiling on the part of the police department.
Additionally, depending on the lighting on the streets in Pleasantville, police
may be able to identify the race of passing drivers at night. Because of these
limitations, a typical difference-in-differences regression using a veil-ofdarkness methodology faces limitations.
Our study is different. Because we exploit a policy change, we are able to
sidestep some of the ordinary concerns surrounding veil-of-darkness
methodologies. Consider again the hypothetical of Pleasantville. Our triple-

294. For an example of a criticism of veil-of-darkness methodologies, see generally Jesse
Kalinowski, Matthew B. Ross & Stephen L. Ross, Endogenous Driving Behavior in Tests of
Racial Profiling in Police Traffic Stops 42 (Univ. of Conn. Dep't of Econ. Working Paper
Series, Paper No. 2017-03R, rev. 2020), https://perma.cc/M28E-MAMV (hypothesizing
that veil-of-darkness tests fail to account for the fact that minority motorists may
adjust their driving behavior to account for the heightened scrutiny they expect to
receive from police as a result of their race during daylight hours, and that this may
undercut the validity of such tests).
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difference methodology conducts the same difference-in-differences regression
described above, except we then take the difference of those difference-indifferences before and after the Arreola decision. Thus, for our purposes, it does
not matter if we fail to account for complicated and racially imbalanced traffic
patterns surrounding the hypothetical twenty-four-hour automobile plant in
Pleasantville. As long as these idiosyncratic differences in driving habits by
race are the same before and after Arreola, then they should not pose any
significant concerns to the validity of our findings. Similarly, in an ordinary
veil-of-darkness methodology, researchers cannot necessarily argue that
darkness completely eliminates the ability of police to identify the race of
passing drivers. For our purpose however, since we are able to calculate two
sets of difference-in-differences, even if we were to still find evidence of racial
profiling in the evening, this does not necessarily bias the result. As long as
police officers have the same approximate ability to identify the race of passing
drivers at night before and after Arreola, our findings should be valid. 295
5.

Additional controls and fixed effects

We are limited in the controls we are able to include in each model given
data availability. We do, however, include in each model-measured at the
county level-the mean age of each driver stopped, the proportion of stops in
any given month and county conducted by a male officer, and the proportion
of stops in any given month and county conducted by a white officer. For the
individual-level regressions, since we are dealing with individual-level data,
these controls are the actual age of the driver and the actual race and gender of
the officer.
Additionally, each regression that is marked as such contains county-level
fixed effects, or a dummy variable for each county that captures the time
invariant, unobserved factors that might be influencing driving as well as
traffic and stopping patterns. For instance, more urbanized counties in
Washington may have a higher concentration of roads, traffic, stops, and

295. Our setup allows and adjusts for this sort of fuzzy baseline group that might also be
influenced by the policy change. This is akin to the difference between a strict and
fuzzy regression-discontinuity design. See generally David S. Lee & Thomas Lemieux,
Regression Discontinuity Designs in Economics, 48 J. ECON. LITERATURE 281 (2010)
(providing an overview of the use of regression-discontinuity designs). Additionally,
our specific triple-difference design is especially attractive in this context because we
are able to account for potential bias in the standard errors that occur in these types of
models, as mentioned previously, by multidirectional clustering, including clusters on
light categorizations (day, night, and twilight). For the sake of consistency, we report
all of the standard errors of our triple-difference regressions clustered at the county by
year levels, though the results are insensitive and stronger if we also cluster by light
exposure.
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nonwhite drivers. County-level fixed effects account for these differences
across counties.
B.

Alternative Models That Include Stops Where Race Is Unidentified as
Stops of Nonwhite Drivers

As discussed in more depth in Part III.B, around 26% of the dataset lacks
data on the race of the driver. 296 And the Washington State Patrol has
previously faced claims that officers purposefully failed to properly document
the race of drivers of color.2 97 Thus, we recognize that it is possible that
troopers may systematically fail to document the race of drivers of color so as
to avoid accusations of racial bias. If this were the case, then evidence of this
racial bias may be masked through an increase in stops where race is
unidentified after Arreola. As we saw in Figure 2, it appears that when we
include stops where race is unidentified in our definition of nonwhite drivers,
the uptick in stops of nonwhite drivers relative to white drivers after Arreola
remains evident.
To account more fully for this possibility, we reproduce here many of the
tables featured earlier in this Article, but this time we include stops where race
is unidentified in our definition of nonwhite drivers. As seen below, regardless
of whether we include stops where race is unidentified in our definition of
nonwhite drivers, our results remain substantially the same.

296. See supranote 177 and accompanying text.
297. See supranotes 179-80 and accompanying text.

712

An Empirical Assessment of Pretextual Stops and Racial Profiling
73 STAN. L. REV. 637 (2021)

Table A.2
Effect of Arreola on Stops of Nonwhite Drivers Relative to White Drivers,

Including Stops Where Race Is Unidentified (2008-2015)
Difference-in-differences regressions

County-evel

fixed effects

Change in stops of
nonwhite drivers

No
121.-8-"`
(32.38-)

Mean driver age

Officer race

Officer gender
R-squared

0201

NC)

Yes

110.2 16

119.568

(9.049)

(34.789)

-16.685---

-2.229

(4.250)

(1.332)

-1,331.197'

198.15)8

(627.205)

(16-.439)

-1,349.498-

-280.420

(584.298)

(182.223)

0.245

05a27

Note: Stop data is reported per county per month. In all but the last row of this
table, the first value is the regression coefficient, while the second value (in
parentheses) is the standard error of that coefficient. The last row of this table
displays the R-squared value for each regression. N = 18,746. Asterisks indicate
degrees of significance: - p <0.1;- p <0.05; -- p <0.01.
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Table A.3
Stops of Nonwhite Drivers at Night Relative to Day Post-Arreola,

Including Stops Where Race Is Unidentified (2008-2015)
Triple-difference regressions

County-evel

fixed effects

Post-Arreola stops of
nonwhite drivers at night
relative to day, relative to
white drivers

No
-39.313'
(15.462)

NC
-42.235
(_.694)

Yes
-39.O03
(15.098)
-1.236*

(1.872)

(0.552)

Percentage of stops by
white officers

-485.961
(225.441)

(50.885)

Percentage of stops by male
officers

-451.086*

-76.931

(207.536)

(52.016)

R-qae

-

-6.903**

Mean driver age

R0.210

0 236

59.001

0.476

Note: Stop data is reported per county per month. In all but the last row of this
table, the first value is the regression coefficient, while the second value (in
parentheses) is the standard error of that coefficient. The last row of this table
displays the R-squared value for each regression. N = 35,192. Asterisks indicate
degrees of significance:' p <0.1; " p <0.05; .. p <0.01.
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Table A.4
Effect of Arreola on Traffic Stops of Nonwhite Drivers That Led to a Warning,

Including Stops Where Race Is Unidentified (2008-2015)
Triple-difference regressions

fixed effects

Post-A rreolawarnings
iven to nonwhite drivers
relative to white drivers
Mean driver age

No

NC

8 .3
(17.6 14)

Percentage of stops by
white officers
Percentage of stops by male
officers
R-squared

Yes

667

988

(5.16 3)

(22.066)

-8.316**

-3.593**

(2.390)

(1.152)

-

County-evel

0.303

-470.436"

9.088

(221.049)

(53.084)

-286.205

48.933

(160.936)

(52.216)

0.330

0.503

Note: Stop data is reported per county per month. In all but the last row of this
table, the first value is the regression coefficient, while the second value (in
parentheses) is the standard error of that coefficient. The last row of this table
displays the R-squared value for each regression. N = 18,746. Asterisks indicate
degrees of significance:' p <0.1; " p <0.05; .. p <0.01.
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Figure A.1
Event Study of Differentials in Stops of White Drivers and Nonwhite Drivers,

Including Stops Where Race Is Unidentified (2009-2015)298
Differentials

-

300

-

200

4

-

100

04-

p

-100
2009
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2011
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298. As with Figure 8, the year 2012 acts as our comparison in the event study since it was
the last full year without treatment. In these event-study-style regressions, we
necessarily must use one year as a baseline for comparison. Because we estimate no
effect in 2012 it has no confidence bounds. We signify that in Figure A.1 with the dot at
zero.
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C.

Alternative Models Assuming Delayed Effect of Training in MixedMotive Stops

As discussed in Part III.A above, it is not clear that Arreola resulted in an
immediate change in police behavior. Instead, it seems plausible that the
decision would result in additional stops of nonwhite drivers only after
officers had been trained in the use of mixed-motive stops. In the tables below,
we present alternative outputs for our primary model. In Tables A.5 and A.6,
we use the date that Arreola first appeared in the WSCJTC monthly digest
(March 2013) rather than the date of the decision (December 2012). In
Table A.5, we exclude stops where race is unidentified from our definition of
nonwhite; in Table A.6, we include stops where race is unidentified in our
definition of nonwhite. Alternatively, in Tables A.7 and A.8, we operate under
the assumption that the full effect of Arreola may have been delayed a full year,
to December 2013, when all officers had sufficient opportunity to be exposed
to the concept of mixed-motive stops through their annual in-service training
requirement. Again, we present these results both excluding (Table A.7) and
including (Table A.8) stops where race is unidentified.
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Table A.5
Effect of Arreola Appearing in the WSCJTC Digest on Stops of Nonwhite Drivers

Relative to White Drivers, Excluding Stops Where Race Is Unidentified (2008-2015)
Difference-in-differences regressions

County-evel

fixed effects

Change in stops of
nonwhite drivers

No

NC

124.6-9

110.387"`

(29.157)-

Mean driver age
-

Officer race

Officer gender
R-squared

0.288

Yes
120.298

(9.806)

(29.944)

-22.335**

-8.718**

(6.380)

(2.747)

1,098.229`

108.906

(488.683)

(132.230)

-824.559

75.682

(433.671)

(144.806)

0.326

0.-)36

Note: Stop data is reported per county per month. In all but the last row of this
table, the first value is the regression coefficient, while the second value (in
parentheses) is the standard error of that coefficient. The last row of this table
displays the R-squared value for each regression. N = 15,470. Asterisks indicate
degrees of significance:' p <0.1; " p <0.05; .. p <0.01.
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Table A.6
Effect of Arreola Appearing in the WSCJTC Digest on Stops of Nonwhite Drivers

Relative to White Drivers, Including Stops Where Race Is Unidentified (2008-2015)
Difference-in-differences regressions

Change in stops of
nonwhite drivers

No

NC

127.551
(22.860)

Mean driver age

Officer race

Officer gender
R-squared

0201

Yes

I 16.160 '

125.342 ~"

(9.16

(27.102)

-16.686---

-2.229

(4.245)

(1.331)

-1,331.289-

197.945

(626.895)

(167.-02)

-

fixed effects

)

County-evel

-1,350.621-

-280.486

(585.058)

(182.321)

0.245

0.528

Note: Stop data is reported per county per month. In all but the last row of this
table, the first value is the regression coefficient, while the second value (in
parentheses) is the standard error of that coefficient. The last row of this table
displays the R-squared value for each regression. N = 18,746. Asterisks indicate
degrees of significance: - p <0.1;- p <0.05; -- p <0.01.
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Table A.7
Effect of ArreolaAfter Annual Training on Stops of Nonwhite Drivers Relative to

White Drivers, Excluding Stops Where Race Is Unidentified (2008-2015)
Difference-in-differences regressions

County-evel

fixed effects

Change in stops of
nonwhite drivers

No

No

Yes

140.943

128.364

138.00

(16.158)

Mean driver age
-

Officer race

Officer gender
R-squared

0.288

(11.51-)

(18.532)

-22.395**

-8.753**

(6.371)

(2.734)

1,096.589`

108.958

(487.752)

(132.824)

-832.276

65.751

(436.277)

(144.199)

0.326

0.136

Note: Stop data is reported per county per month. In all but the last row of this
table, the first value is the regression coefficient, while the second value (in
parentheses) is the standard error of that coefficient. The last row of this table
displays the R-squared value for each regression. N = 15,470. Asterisks indicate
degrees of significance:' p <0.1; " p <0.05; .. p <0.01.
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Table A.8
Effect of ArreolaAfter Annual Training on Stops of Nonwhite Drivers Relative to

White Drivers, Including Stops Where Race Is Unidentified (2008-2015)
Difference-in-differences regressions

Countyevel

fixed effects

Change in stops of
nonwhite drivers

No
153.188
(9.-48)

Mean driver age

Officer race

Officer gender
R-squared

0201

NC
138.531'

Yes
147.570

(15.831)

(12.475)

-16.741---

-2.255

(4.242)

(1.333)

-1,329.164'-

198.810

(62 5.8-74)

(168.160

-1,354.505-

-285.981

(587.27 1)

(181.837)

0.245

.-

)28

Note: Stop data is reported per county per month. In all but the last row of this
table, the first value is the regression coefficient, while the second value (in
parentheses) is the standard error of that coefficient. The last row of this table
displays the R-squared value for each regression. N = 18,746. Asterisks indicate
degrees of significance: p <0.1;- p <0.05; -- p <0.01.
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D.

Effects of Arreola on Searches

Finally, we disaggregate the data and employ the same difference-indifferences technique to measure any possible effect of Arreola on the
probability of getting searched after getting stopped. 299 That is, formally:
Model A.1
Pr (Search| Stop) qt= a + blnonwhitek + b2Arreolar+ b3 nonwhite ' Arreolagr+ AX +

s

This model predicts the probability of getting searched conditional on
getting stopped. Whereas Models 1 and 2 above estimate the change in total
stops per county per month, Model A.1 is measured at the individual stop
level q in county k at time t. While there may be some concern with the
estimation of Model A.1 regarding changes in driving behavior and/or stop
practices that do not directly reflect the procedural change that occurred with
Arreola, reshaping the dataset in this way allows us to control for any changes
in driving behavior and/or police stopping behaviors since we are looking at
searches of cars that have already been stopped. While Model 1 gives some
insight into the overall effect of Arreola-that is, the total increase/decrease in
stops of nonwhite drivers per county per month-Model A.1 allows us to look
more specifically at the probability of getting searched after the stop occurs,
which should mitigate changes from unobserved factors like driving behavior.
Tables A.9 and A.10 employ this difference-in-differences modeling to
examine the effect of Arreola on the probability of nonwhite drivers getting
searched relative to white drivers. The results of this model represent the
change in the probability of getting searched conditional on being stopped
relative to white drivers-so a positive number suggests an increase in the
likelihood of getting searched after being stopped relative to white drivers, and
a negative number indicates a decrease in the likelihood.

299. Additional models considering the impact of Arreola on search outcomes are available
upon request. For the sake of brevity, we include only these primary results.
Additionally, while there are fewer theoretical reasons why the legalization of
recreational marijuana would contribute to increased numbers of traffic stops of
particular racial groups, it seems plausible that legalization may have an effect on the
frequency of searches and other behavior after traffic stops. Thus, we conduct only a
more limited evaluation of this topic in this Article.
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Table A.9
Effect of Arreola on Probability of Vehicle Searches of Nonwhite Drivers,

Including Stops Where Race Is Unidentified (2008-2015)
Difference-in-differences regressions

Count yevel

fixed effects

Change in searches of
nonwh ite drivers

No

NC

0.00310
(0.00038)

Driver age

Officer race

Officer gender
R-squared

0.002

0.00298

Yes
0.00314

(0.00048)

(0.00016)

-0.00038***

-0.00035***

(0.00008)

(0.00007)

0.00267

0.00451

(0.00192)

(0.00237)

0.00134

0.00162

(0.00114)

(0.00085)

0.003

0.009

Note: Search data is reported on an individual basis. In all but the last row of this
table, the first value is the regression coefficient, while the second value (in
parentheses) is the standard error of that coefficient. The last row of this table
displays the R-squared value for each regression. N= 8,257,527. Asterisks indicate
degrees of significance: p <0.1; p <0.05;. p <0.01.
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Table A.10
Effect of Arreola on Probability of Vehicle Searches of Nonwhite Drivers,

Excluding Stops Where Race Is Unidentified (2008-2015)
Difference-in-differences regressions

Countyevel

fixed effects

Change in searches of
nonwhite drivers

No

NC

-0.0059
(0.0010)

Driver age

Officer race

Officer gender
R-squared

0.002

-0.0060

Yes
-0.0058

(0.0011)

(0.0014)

0.00065***

0.00061***

(0.00011)

(0.00010)

0.00419

0.00686`

(0.00218)

(0.00311)

-0.00054

-0.00002

(0.00136)

(0.00102)

0.095

0.012

Note: Search data is reported on an individual basis. In all but the last row of this
table, the first value is the regression coefficient, while the second value (in
parentheses) is the standard error of that coefficient. The last row of this table
displays the R-squared value for each regression. N= 6,077,266. Asterisks indicate
degrees of significance: p <0.1; p <0.05;. p <0.01.
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Table A.9 suggests that after Arreola, stops of nonwhite drivers may be
more likely to result in searches than stops of white drivers. If Arreola
empowered police to investigate hunches through mixed-motive traffic stops,
and if these traffic stops were more likely to target nonwhite drivers, this is
consistent with the expected outcome. 30 0 But the results flip when we remove
these cases where driver race is unidentified from our analysis, as seen in
Table A.10. Thus, on this point, the evidence is somewhat inconclusive.
However, as stated previously, we believe including the "n/a" classifications as
nonwhite may more accurately capture officers who systematically
misidentify (or fail to identify) the race of nonwhite drivers to avoid detection
of possible racial profiling.3 01
In total, when we include stops where race is unidentified in the definition
of nonwhite in Table A.9, we find that Arreola is associated with a 0.3percentage-point increase in the probability of officers searching the vehicle of
a nonwhite driver incident to a traffic stop. While that might not seem like a
substantial increase in the likelihood of a search incident to a stop, since only
2.2% of stops resulted in searches, a 0.3-percentage-point increase represents
around a 14% increase in the likelihood of getting searched. These results are
statistically significant with and without the introduction of controls and fixed
effects.
Another way to evaluate this hypothesis is to consider the hit rate of
searches of white and nonwhite drivers-that is, the frequency with which a
300. Evidence gathered by prior scholars on how police approach pretextual investigatory
stops informs the possible link between pretextual stops and subsequent police
searches. Charles R. Epp, Steven Maynard-Moody, and Donald Haider-Markel
observed that after the Supreme Court issued its decision in Whren, police departments
across the country trained officers to use pretextual justifications to conduct so-called
"investigatory stops." EPP ET AL., supra note 15, at 36 (describing the institutionalization
of the investigatory stop in the 1990s across American police departments). Advocates
of these stops argued that they could proactively prevent criminal activity. Id.
(describing how the International Association of Chiefs of Police "enthusiastically
encouraged police departments [across the country] to adopt this practice," in part
because of a belief that it "'may be our most effective tool for interdicting criminals"'
(quoting Earl M. Sweeney, Traffic Enforcement: New Uses for an Old Tool, POLICE CHIEF,
July 1996, at 45)). A "book-length police training text" by Charles Remsberg, which a
leading policing consultant has praised as an authoritative text on the subject, advises
officers to follow several steps in employing investigatory stops. Id. at 36-37 (citing
CHARLES REMSBERG, TACTICS FOR CRIMINAL PATROL: VEHICLE STOPS, DRUG DISCOVERY

AND OFFICER SURVIVAL (1995)). First, Remsberg says officers should develop suspicion
or curiosity about a driver and identify some legal justification for a traffic stop (often
a minor traffic violation). Id. at 36. Then, after stopping the driver, the officer should
decide whether they can justify a search of the vehicle based on observation and a
conversation with the driver. Id. at 36-37. When possible, Remsberg also advises
officers to seek the consent of the driver to search the vehicle, in hopes of finding
evidence of criminal behavior. See id. at 37.
301. See supra notes 177-81 and accompanying text.
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vehicle search leads to the discovery of contraband. To test this hypothesis, we
calculate the hit rate of searches across our dataset. We find that prior to
Arreola searches of vehicles driven by white individuals resulted in the
discovery of contraband 19% of the time. By contrast, only 15% of searches of
vehicles driven by nonwhite individuals resulted in the discovery of
contraband prior to Arreola. Admittedly, the use of hit-rate analysis is
complicated by the fact that Washington legalized recreational marijuana
during the time frame that we study. This may explain the drop in hit rates for
vehicle searches for both white and nonwhite drivers. Nonetheless, postArreola hit rates for nonwhite drivers remained comparatively lower (7%) than
hit rates for white drivers (8%).
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